Sunday, November 1, 2009

Revolt in New York

Revolt in New York

Beltway bigs misjudged public dismay against the Democratic agenda in Washington.

Saturday's decision by Republican Dede Scozzafava to drop out of tomorrow's special Congressional election in upstate New York is a potentially big political moment that could help to return the GOP to first principles—or could lead to internecine ruin. Much will depend on how GOP leaders and conservative activists respond.

Picked by GOP elites without a primary and with a voting record to the left of many Albany Democrats, Ms. Scozzafava faced a revolt by local and national conservatives in favor of businessman Doug Hoffman, who was nominated on the Conservative Party line. The longtime GOP assemblywoman saw herself falling in the polls and yesterday endorsed Democratic lawyer Bill Owens, who could still win the GOP-leaning seat with a plurality.

The voter revolt ought to be a lesson to the GOP's backroom boys, especially in New York state, where the old Al D'Amato insider club has led the party to irrelevance. GOP state chairman Joe Mondello, now thankfully retired, and Beltway bigs misjudged public dismay against the Democratic agenda in Washington. Nominating a candidate who "can win" in the Northeast does not have to mean someone whose voting record is more liberal on taxes and unions than that of most Blue Dog Democrats.

But that lesson will be for naught if conservatives conclude that their victory is reason to challenge any candidate who doesn't agree with them on every issue. The truth is that some conservatives are as bloody-minded and intolerant of all dissent as the hard left is at the Daily Kos. A majority political party requires a far more diverse coalition than the audience for your average right-wing blogger or talk show host. Some of those voices prefer having Democrats in power because it drives up their own ratings.

Democrats did themselves no favors by driving Joe Lieberman out of their party, and conservatives will do their cause no good by forcing GOP candidates in Illinois, California and Connecticut to sound like Tom DeLay. If conservatives now revolt against every GOP candidate who disagrees with them on trade, immigration or abortion, Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid will keep their majorities for a very long time.

The Worst Bill Ever
Epic new spending and taxes, pricier insurance, rationed care, dishonest accounting: The Pelosi health bill has it all.

Speaker Nancy Pelosi has reportedly told fellow Democrats that she's prepared to lose seats in 2010 if that's what it takes to pass ObamaCare, and little wonder. The health bill she unwrapped last Thursday, which President Obama hailed as a "critical milestone," may well be the worst piece of post-New Deal legislation ever introduced.

In a rational political world, this 1,990-page runaway train would have been derailed months ago. With spending and debt already at record peacetime levels, the bill creates a new and probably unrepealable middle-class entitlement that is designed to expand over time. Taxes will need to rise precipitously, even as ObamaCare so dramatically expands government control of health care that eventually all medicine will be rationed via politics.

Yet at this point, Democrats have dumped any pretense of genuine bipartisan "reform" and moved into the realm of pure power politics as they race against the unpopularity of their own agenda. The goal is to ram through whatever income-redistribution scheme they can claim to be "universal coverage." The result will be destructive on every level—for the health-care system, for the country's fiscal condition, and ultimately for American freedom and prosperity.

•The spending surge. The Congressional Budget Office figures the House program will cost $1.055 trillion over a decade, which while far above the $829 billion net cost that Mrs. Pelosi fed to credulous reporters is still a low-ball estimate. Most of the money goes into government-run "exchanges" where people earning between 150% and 400% of the poverty level—that is, up to about $96,000 for a family of four in 2016—could buy coverage at heavily subsidized rates, tied to income. The government would pay for 93% of insurance costs for a family making $42,000, 72% for another making $78,000, and so forth.

At least at first, these benefits would be offered only to those whose employers don't provide insurance or work for small businesses with 100 or fewer workers. The taxpayer costs would be far higher if not for this "firewall"—which is sure to cave in when people see the deal their neighbors are getting on "free" health care. Mrs. Pelosi knows this, like everyone else in Washington.

Even so, the House disguises hundreds of billions of dollars in additional costs with budget gimmicks. It "pays for" about six years of program with a decade of revenue, with the heaviest costs concentrated in the second five years. The House also pretends Medicare payments to doctors will be cut by 21.5% next year and deeper after that, "saving" about $250 billion. ObamaCare will be lucky to cost under $2 trillion over 10 years; it will grow more after that.

• Expanding Medicaid, gutting private Medicare. All this is particularly reckless given the unfunded liabilities of Medicare—now north of $37 trillion over 75 years. Mrs. Pelosi wants to steal $426 billion from future Medicare spending to "pay for" universal coverage. While Medicare's price controls on doctors and hospitals are certain to be tightened, the only cut that is a sure thing in practice is gutting Medicare Advantage to the tune of $170 billion. Democrats loathe this program because it gives one of out five seniors private insurance options.

As for Medicaid, the House will expand eligibility to everyone below 150% of the poverty level, meaning that some 15 million new people will be added to the rolls as private insurance gets crowded out at a cost of $425 billion. A decade from now more than a quarter of the population will be on a program originally intended for poor women, children and the disabled.

Even though the House will assume 91% of the "matching rate" for this joint state-federal program—up from today's 57%—governors would still be forced to take on $34 billion in new burdens when budgets from Albany to Sacramento are in fiscal collapse. Washington's budget will collapse too, if anything like the House bill passes.

• European levels of taxation. All told, the House favors $572 billion in new taxes, mostly by imposing a 5.4-percentage-point "surcharge" on joint filers earning over $1 million, $500,000 for singles. This tax will raise the top marginal rate to 45% in 2011 from 39.6% when the Bush tax cuts expire—not counting state income taxes and the phase-out of certain deductions and exemptions. The burden will mostly fall on the small businesses that have organized as Subchapter S or limited liability corporations, since the truly wealthy won't have any difficulty sheltering their incomes.

This surtax could hit ever more earners because, like the alternative minimum tax, it isn't indexed for inflation. Yet it still won't be nearly enough. Even if Congress had confiscated 100% of the taxable income of people earning over $500,000 in the boom year of 2006, it would have only raised $1.3 trillion. When Democrats end up soaking the middle class, perhaps via the European-style value-added tax that Mrs. Pelosi has endorsed, they'll claim the deficits that they created made them do it.

Under another new tax, businesses would have to surrender 8% of their payroll to government if they don't offer insurance or pay at least 72.5% of their workers' premiums, which eat into wages. Such "play or pay" taxes always become "pay or pay" and will rise over time, with severe consequences for hiring, job creation and ultimately growth. While the U.S. already has one of the highest corporate income tax rates in the world, Democrats are on the way to creating a high structural unemployment rate, much as Europe has done by expanding its welfare states.

Meanwhile, a tax equal to 2.5% of adjusted gross income will also be imposed on some 18 million people who CBO expects still won't buy insurance in 2019. Democrats could make this penalty even higher, but that is politically unacceptable, or they could make the subsidies even higher, but that would expose the (already ludicrous) illusion that ObamaCare will reduce the deficit.

• The insurance takeover. A new "health choices commissioner" will decide what counts as "essential benefits," which all insurers will have to offer as first-dollar coverage. Private insurers will also be told how much they are allowed to charge even as they will have to offer coverage at virtually the same price to anyone who applies, regardless of health status or medical history.

The cost of insurance, naturally, will skyrocket. The insurer WellPoint estimates based on its own market data that some premiums in the individual market will triple under these new burdens. The same is likely to prove true for the employer-sponsored plans that provide private coverage to about 177 million people today. Over time, the new mandates will apply to all contracts, including for the large businesses currently given a safe harbor from bureaucratic tampering under a 1974 law called Erisa.

The political incentive will always be for government to expand benefits and reduce cost-sharing, trampling any chance of giving individuals financial incentives to economize on care. Essentially, all insurers will become government contractors, in the business of fulfilling political demands: There will be no such thing as "private" health insurance.
***

All of this is intentional, even if it isn't explicitly acknowledged. The overriding liberal ambition is to finish the work began decades ago as the Great Society of converting health care into a government responsibility. Mr. Obama's own Medicare actuaries estimate that the federal share of U.S. health dollars will quickly climb beyond 60% from 46% today. One reason Mrs. Pelosi has fought so ferociously against her own Blue Dog colleagues to include at least a scaled-back "public option" entitlement program is so that the architecture is in place for future Congresses to expand this share even further.

As Congress's balance sheet drowns in trillions of dollars in new obligations, the political system will have no choice but to start making cost-minded decisions about which treatments patients are allowed to receive. Democrats can't regulate their way out of the reality that we live in a world of finite resources and infinite wants. Once health care is nationalized, or mostly nationalized, medical rationing is inevitable—especially for the innovative high-cost technologies and drugs that are the future of medicine.

Mr. Obama rode into office on a wave of "change," but we doubt most voters realized that the change Democrats had in mind was making health care even more expensive and rigid than the status quo. Critics will say we are exaggerating, but we believe it is no stretch to say that Mrs. Pelosi's handiwork ranks with the Smoot-Hawley tariff and FDR's National Industrial Recovery Act as among the worst bills Congress has ever seriously contemplated.
Hillary's Honduran Exit Strategy
Honduras signs a deal that means international recognition of the November 29 elections.

By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY

If there is one person in Honduras who is more despised these days than deposed president Manuel Zelaya it is a foreigner who goes by the name of Hugo. We refer here not to the Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez but to U.S. Ambassador Hugo Llorens.

Many Hondurans, including, rumor has it, President Roberto Micheletti, see Mr. Llorens as the principal architect of a U.S. policy that has caused enormous Honduran hardship.

There is a chance that the agreement signed late Thursday between the interim government and Mr. Zelaya will put an end to that suffering. Finally the U.S. and the Organization of American States (OAS) have agreed to step aside and allow Honduran institutions to decide if Mr. Zelaya is to be reinstated. Without international meddling, it is quite likely that Mr. Zelaya will be refused the presidency once more.

Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.

Yet many risks remain, starting with the fact that though the U.S. said it was going to butt out of Honduran affairs, old habits die hard. Referring to Mr. Zelaya's bid for reinstatement, Thomas Shannon, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemispheric affairs, said last week, "That's the issue that's the most provocative and the one we will be watching most closely." Mr. Shannon should try watching the World Series instead.

The need to dictate to Hondurans how to run their country has been the problem from the start. The moment the Honduran Supreme Court ordered the arrest of Mr. Zelaya in June for organizing mob violence and attempting to overthrow the constitution Mr. Llorens anointed himself colonial viceroy in charge of imposing U.S. will. Plenty of Molotov-hurling leftists also took Mr. Zelaya's side. But Mr. Llorens staked out a position for the U.S., defending the legitimacy of the erratic former president. The U.S. ambassador used every weapon he could lay his hands on to try to force the country to restore Mr. Zelaya to power.

This violated Honduran sovereignty. But Mr. Llorens's boss back home, Barack Obama, seemed more interested in appeasing U.S. enemies than standing by friends, or even sticking to his pledge not to meddle in other countries' affairs. Mr. Chávez and Fidel Castro were supporting Mr. Zelaya, and Mr. Obama apparently wanted to be part of the gang.

Clearly no one in Washington expected it to be so hard to break the will of Hondurans. That effort became even more embarrassing when zelayistas mounted a campaign of terror, kidnapping and murdering Honduran authorities and their relatives. There were at least three such incidents in two weeks. The terrorists were also sabotaging the country's electricity grid. To avoid further taint, the U.S. sent a delegation to strike the compromise reached late Thursday.

The spin is that Mr. Zelaya will return to power. But the Honduran Congress will decide that, using opinions from the Supreme Court, the attorney general and other legal experts. Since it was the court and Congress that threw Mr. Zelaya out, this is positive. Yet if the court, which has the legal upper hand, stands firm and Congress reverses itself in favor of Mr. Zelaya, there will be a constitutional crisis.

That's not impossible, as the Zelaya reputation for buying votes is legendary. In May, the mayor of Tegucigalpa publicly denounced an offer by the Zelaya government to pay him $15 million to support a referendum on rewriting the constitution. Mr. Chávez has money too, and so do other drug-trafficking terrorist organizations around the region, like Colombia's FARC and numerous Central American gangs. These groups are notorious for infiltrating institutions. Honduras isn't immune.

Yet it is likely that the interim government decided to take the gamble because it believes that the high court and Congress, which both voted overwhelmingly to strip Mr. Zelaya of the office, will stand strong. In return for this risk, it gets U.S. and OAS recognition of the Nov. 29 presidential elections.

What is more, there will be no amnesty for Mr. Zelaya. He already has more than a dozen outstanding arrest warrants against him, and when he steps out of the Brazilian Embassy it is fully expected that he will be detained. The agreement also says that there will be no constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution so as to end presidential term limits.

Unnamed U.S. officials have told the press that Mr. Zelaya probably is coming back, turning up the heat on Honduras's Congress. And the OAS's General Secretary José Miguel Insulza is making noise about returning to Honduras to involve the OAS in Congress's decision. But Mr. Shannon reiterated to me yesterday that the U.S. believes this is now an issue for Honduran institutions to settle. He completely rejected a report in Sunday's El Pais newspaper claiming he is lobbying for votes for Mr. Zelaya's return.

By signing this agreement, Honduras helped Mr. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton save face. In return, Mrs. Clinton should tell Mr. Insulza to stay out of the country and its affairs. She should also tell U.S. officials to cease and desist with their pro-Zelaya rumors. While she's at it, the secretary could reassign Mr. Llorens. Havana comes to mind as a suitable posting. He will be greeted as a hero by the Castros and will find it easy to continue his friendship with Mr. Zelaya.

FOX News Sunday Panel -- ObamaCare

Williams with Sowell - Government-Run Health Care

livingston southern secession pt2

The Gold Standard and the Great Depression

by

Fort Knox

Paul Krugman has concentrated his fire recently on those "thumping their chests" over the falling dollar. He has particular scorn for those recommending a return to the gold standard. In Krugman's view, a simple look at the historical facts will show that it was a superstitious fetish for the yellow metal that prolonged the Great Depression.

A careful, comprehensive response to Krugman's charges would involve an explanation of the classical gold standard, and the wonderful peace and prosperity it showered on the world. It was only after the major countries abandoned gold during World War I that major imbalances in international trade began to fester — imbalances that eventually exploded during the early 1930s.[1] As a good capitalist pig, I point the reader to my book on the Depression for the full story.

Fortunately, we can take a shortcut in the present article. Using Krugman's own graph, we can see that the case for abandoning gold — and devaluing currencies in the process — is not nearly as straightforward as he seems to think.

Krugman's Graphical Case for Debasement

Here's Krugman setting up his graph. Note that the strikethrough, and accompanying text in the brackets, is from Krugman's post. What happened is that Krugman originally wrote one order of the countries going off gold, then a reader told him he was mistaken in the comments, so Krugman fixed his apparent error and explained this in brackets. I have included it as is below, because Krugman's bracketed explanation makes it crystal clear what his point is:

If there's one overwhelming lesson from the Great Depression, it is that putting a higher priority on stabilizing your currency than on domestic recovery is utterly disastrous. Barry Eichengreen pointed out years ago that major economies went off gold in the following order: Japan, Germany, Britain Britain, Germany, US, France. [screwed it up in the first draft: the correlation between going off gold and recovery is in fact perfect] And here's what happened to their industrial output….

Krugman reproduces a chart from this paper by Barry Eichengreen. This has been quite popular in the progressive blogosphere; indeed Brad DeLong features a modified version of it on the left margin of his main page. Here is the chart that apparently clinches the fact that the gold standard caused — or at least exacerbated — the Great Depression:

Inflation-Adjusted Industrial Output
Figure 1
(Index 1929=100, annual averages, axis notched at year's midpoint)

Before moving on, let's be clear on why Krugman thinks the above chart is so damning to the goldbugs. By 1937, if you rank the nations' industrial output relative to 1929 levels, the order is Japan, Britain, Germany, the United States, and finally France. Now if you ask, In what order did countries abandon the gold standard? Why, the answer (Krugman tells us, after making the correction to his original post) is the same! So, this is apparently decisive evidence that abandoning gold was the way to get out of the Great Depression.

Quibbles With Dating

The first problem with Krugman's demonstration is that he's got his dates wrong. For example, Krugman himself reproduces the following correction from economic historian Peter Temin:

Germany went off gold before the UK in 1931, in July and August, that is, before late September when the UK devalued. The story however is a bit complex because Germany went off gold by eliminating the free flow of gold. They kept the value of the mark steady all through the Nazi period (see Adam Tooze's good book), but they controlled the flow of foreign exchange. The reason that this does not show up on your graph is that the German chancellor in 1931 (Bruening) followed the dictates of the gold standard in 1931, keeping interest rates high and deflating the economy. This is what I called the gold-standard mentality in Lessons from the Great Depression (1989).

So we already see nuances in the official story. Really, it's not tying a currency to gold per se that was the problem; the real problem was refusing to devalue a currency (which the gold standard made difficult).

But then we have another problem. In the chart, Japan is the best example. They apparently go off gold first, they have an almost immediate recovery, and they end up with the highest 1937 production. So here's my problem: Why do all these various sites (e.g. here and here) from Google tell me that Japan abandoned the gold standard in December 1931 — several months after Great Britain (in September 1931)?

Now, Japan had only gone back on gold the prior year, in January 1930, so maybe that's what Krugman's dateline is based on. In other words, whoever is telling Krugman that Japan went off gold first, might be dismissing the January 1930–December 1931 period as insignificant.

Be that as it may, all five of the countries under discussion were on a gold (exchange) standard as of January 1931. Then, if you ask in what order did they sever their currencies' ties to gold, the actual ranking is: Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and France.

Notice that the "perfect" correlation cited by Krugman has broken down significantly. Yes, the 4th and 5th countries go off gold end up ranked 4th and 5th, respectively, in terms of industrial output in 1937. But the other three countries are now ranked as if the correlation is precisely the reverse of Krugman's original claim. That is, the 3rd country to go off gold (Japan) is ranked 1st in output, the 2nd country to go off gold (Britain) is ranked 2nd in output, and the 1st country to go off gold (Germany) is ranked 3rd in output. If we just looked at those three countries, we would conclude that "history shows" abandoning the gold standard was the way to cripple your economic recovery.

Krugman can cite other policies if he wants. That's the tack Brad DeLong takes, when he titles his version of the chart to indicate that a country needs to go off gold and start its "New Deal" for the medicine to work. I'm simply pointing out here that it seems Krugman's history concerning dates of abandoning gold is just wrong. When the "pattern" really only works for three out of five countries, it's time to drop the particular argument and find a different one to make your point.

Does Industrial Output Really Respond to Devaluation?

Let's move beyond the quibbles over particular dates. If it turned out that Krugman's original ordering of historical devaluations were correct, would that give fans of the gold standard something to worry about?

Not really. Remember, the appeal of the above chart is that it seems to show that from 1929–1937, industrial output is proportional to the speed with which a country abandoned its currency's peg to gold. But what is so magical about 1929–1937? I think the only thing objective about it is that 1937 is the first year all of these countries had abandoned their peg.

If we lengthened the time frames, what would happen? After all, the Great Depression certainly wasn't over in 1937, so it's not clear that we're seeing the full story with Eichengreen's chart. I don't have convenient access to the raw figures, but it wouldn't surprise me if the ranking bounced around if you took a snapshot in 1938 or 1939. Naturally, the military situation in Europe would be relevant here — but then again, it was relevant in 1937 as well.

Even if we look at the data in the selected time frame, though, it's not obvious that abandoning gold should be credited with rescuing various countries' industrial output. Rather than simply comparing 1929 output to 1937 output, and then comparing the countries' ranking in this respect to the order in which they abandoned gold, we can use the above chart to see the allegedly beneficial effects of devaluation play out over time.

For example, Germany and the United States both experienced a significant rebound in (the annual average of) industrial output from 1932 to 1933. Krugman wants to credit the abandonment of gold with this feat. Yet France also experienced just as significant a recovery from 1932 to 1933, even though it stayed tied to gold until 1936.

So, although the chart plausibly shows the benefits to Japan and Britain for going off gold in 1931, it certainly doesn't show the benefits to the United States and Germany. Of course, Krugman could say that it was the United States and German recovery that lifted France as well — but that causality doesn't jump out from the chart itself. And Krugman was citing the chart as independent evidence of the stupidity of the gold standard.

Finally, let's look a little more carefully at the case of the United States. A critic of the gold standard looks at the chart above and concludes, "Sticking with gold drove the economy into the toilet, but once FDR freed the dollar from the peg in March 1933, it was smooth sailing."

But no, that's not what the chart above shows. Before I can make the point, though, we need to clarify something: The United States abandoned the historical gold peg at $20.67 per ounce in March 1933 when FDR seized Americans' gold at gunpoint. Then, he literally set the gold price based on superstitions like "lucky numbers." (I explain these apparently crazy claims in my book.) But in 1934, the dollar was re-pegged to gold at $35 an ounce, where it stayed until that (allegedly) conservative free marketeer Nixon truly abandoned the gold standard in 1971. See for yourself:

Figure 2

So, with that historical information in hand, look again at Eichengreen's allegedly damning chart. Yes, the United States enjoyed a sharp recovery in 1933 relative to 1932 output. But it also enjoyed significant growth in 1935 and 1936, well after the dollar had been tied again to gold (at a lower parity). It's not obvious at all that it was the gold standard driving the movements of US industrial output during 1929–1937.

Why Going Off Gold Could Have Boosted Output

Remember that "abandoning gold" isn't akin to shaving one's mustache. When a country dropped a peg, it effectively ripped off every investor who had been holding assets denominated in it. Thus it's not surprising that some countries could experience apparent prosperity — especially if we just look at the short run — by abandoning gold.

For an analogy, someone who just bought an expensive house with no down payment, and who doesn't plan to apply for more loans anytime soon, could definitely gain a windfall by "abandoning his mortgage" (assuming the bank couldn't seize the property). That doesn't mean it's a shot in the arm for the economy. (Though of course, all analogies break down in our current crisis. The pundits really do think "abandoning mortgages" would be a good idea right now!)

Part of what happened in the 1930s was that the countries who stayed on gold were harmed when other governments reneged on their contractual obligations. For example, one of the smoking guns in the antigold case is that the Federal Reserve had to raise interest rates (after bringing them to unprecedented lows) in 1931, in response to Great Britain's abandonment of gold. What happened was that investors around the world feared the United States would follow Britain's example, and so they began redeeming their dollars for gold, thus draining US reserves. Hence, the Fed had to hike US interest rates to stem the outflow of gold.

Inflation Can Help If the Government Is Propping Up Wages

Another major factor is that governments in the 1930s were interfering with wages and prices more so than at any prior point in (peacetime) history. For example, after the 1929 stock-market crash, President Herbert Hoover began a series of conferences with big business and labor leaders, telling them that cutting wage rates (the standard response in previous depressions) would be disastrous, because then the workers wouldn't make enough to buy the products.

This meant that nominal paychecks fell much more slowly during the early years of the Great Depression than the general price level. Consequently, if you kept your job, you experienced a higher increase in real (inflation-adjusted) wages during the early 1930s, than during the Roaring 1920s! So, it's no wonder that unemployment reached record highs during Hoover's first and only term. If a president wants to get a huge glut on the labor market during his administration, textbook economics says to prop up wages above their market-clearing level.

Now in this context, when FDR reneged on the US government's promise to redeem dollars for gold, it allowed the Federal Reserve to flood the economy with new dollars. The falling price level turned around on a dime, as this chart indicates:

Figure 3

Generally speaking, printing up green pieces of paper doesn't make an economy more productive; it merely redistributes the existing property while making it harder to plan for the future. But, if the government is also preventing wage rates from falling to their new, market-clearing level, then inflating the currency has the benefit of reducing unemployment.

Of course, this observation is no justification for what FDR did. Had prices and wages been left to the market, the recovery would have been swift, just as it was in the 1920–1921 depression. Even so, fans of the gold standard need to understand why the economy apparently recovered so quickly after FDR devalued the dollar.

Conclusion

Intuitively, it makes no sense to say that the major dislocations of the world's economies in the 1930s could have been solved simply by printing up pieces of paper. When we closely examine the graphical evidence that apparently proves this strange claim, we see it falls apart. Krugman and Friends need to convince us, first, that their history is accurate, and second, that their charts really prove what they claim.

Halloween and its Candy Economy

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"The true magic of Halloween is the transforming effect of free exchange…"

Dale Steinreich once wrote that Halloween has a "socialist tenor" because "menacing figures arrive at your door uninvited, demand your property, and threaten to perform an unspecified 'trick' if you don't fork over. That's the way the government works in a nutshell."

And yet, for overall kid excitement, Halloween seems to surpass Christmas, at least from what I can observe. The kids spend months preparing their costumes, and thrill to every detail of the ceremony: pumpkins, scary things, and of course candy. For the children, too, there is the attractive fact that parents are not all that happy about Halloween with its goblins, gore, and gluttony.

But, a deeper lesson to be drawn is that there is also an economic dimension to Halloween that goes far beyond simply demanding property with menaces, however lighthearted.

Unlike at Christmas, where kids must only be good little citizens all year in order to be showered with gifts from their beneficent Guardians, at Halloween, kids must actually work in real time for their candy.

Because there is no taboo in place about trading one's proceeds, the kids also have a chance to participate in genuine market experiences.

For starters, they work hard on their costumes, under the very real expectation that those who hand out candy tend to be more generous to those with better costumes. Nor is the labor done there, for it clearly continues with the long walk around the neighborhood, with the prospect that each house visited will yield a gain of only one or two candies, at most.

This in itself forms an interesting feature of the ritual, since all of these same kids have lots of candy back at home that is being given out to other kids even as they tramp through the cold October evening. What could be the point of seeking out abroad what you already have at home?

There are two reasons: first, though the kids may not consciously recognize it, they surely appreciate the candy more if it represents something they have to go seek out for themselves, and second, by mixing their labor with the process of candy acquisition, they have a greater sense that the candy partakes of qualities of duly earned, private property.

No child really believes that the bowls of candy at home really belong to him or her, but, by contrast, the candy that the child collects from the neighborhood is said to be his or hers exclusively, even if mom or dad still oversees the overall patterns of distribution.

The candy you collect is yours, a product of your own efforts, and nothing can quite replace that feeling of merited ownership. And yet, the real thrill is far from over.

What children truly adore about Halloween is what takes place after the candy has been brought back to home base: the trading. Here is where the excitement begins.

No child can fully control what he or she is given, so it is up to that child to make exchanges with others in order to obtain what he or she really wants, and to do so in a strategic manner so that overall wealth is enhanced.

This process of trading began at our house at 8pm and lasted for about 30 minutes, at which point, the children concluded that they had come as close as was possible to what they wanted most and so, that there was no more trading left to do.

During the 30 minutes of active haggling, nine kids sat around the dining room table and participated in a hectic, yet orderly — if complex — interchange, bearing a good deal of resemblance to a Wall Street trading floor.

Some traders shot up and shouted prices, deals, proposals, results, changes in preferences, new resource discoveries. Other traders remained quiet and moved with great subtlety and surprise. The more strategic the plan, the more impressed the other kids were by it.

It was fascinating to watch as the trading began slowly and as the first barter relationships began to form.

One for one; two for one; three packages of Nerds for one popcorn ball; two Snickers for one candy necklace; a Blowpop for two pieces of caramel; and so on.

All children brought to the table their own subjective sense of what was valuable — a sense which was strongly influenced by the corresponding opinions of the other players, but one which also added to it a degree of prediction concerning just how the subjective values of others would stack up.

It wasn't long before barter relationships, even those involving 3 or 4 simultaneous transactions, did not suffice.

What those around the table needed was some means to achieve indirect exchange. They needed to hit upon a good which everyone would desire to posses because of its more certain, onward marketability among all the other kids.

This entity did not need to be highly valued from the outset by everyone present. What the kids only needed to notice was that there was something which a sufficient number of their group tended to want more than any other competing candy on offer.

It was a short step from there to the dawning of a realization would occur to one or two kids. These would then try to acquire that particular candy, not to consume it themselves, but to use it to trade it for whatever other candy they really wanted to enjoy.

As more and more of the participants copied them, this one candy would come to play a role in more and more indirect exchanges. Child A would accept it from Child B for a less desired kind of candy and would instantly swap it again with Child C who happened to have the goodie he or she really preferred, but who hadn't wanted any of A's originally proffered treats.

This way, this one candy would come to posses a quality none of the others had. It would come to be money.

In general, money, whatever specific form it takes, tends to have a high value per unit of weight and yet it should be spilt into units small enough to cope with any scale of exchange. It should ideally have a fixed supply. Above all, it must be the one thing most readily accepted in settlement of a trade because the acceptor knows it is something which can, with the highest available degree of certainty, be used to facilitate additional future trades.

There is no way to know ahead of time what will fulfill this role; only the market process itself will reveal this choice.

In our house, the popcorn ball would not work since there were only four of them and these were not divisible into smaller units. The Twizzlers did not pass the test because only one child had any knowledge of what they tasted like and hence no one else had any concept of their value.

Though this problem might seem an intractable one, as it happened, it only took a few minutes for everyone to discover what would become money for the evening: a micro-size Three Musketeers bar.

Before people realized the true measure of its usefulness, a 3M would trade for as little as a Smarty package. But, then, it began to rise in value — selling for the Smarty and a Tootsie Roll.

Once it became clear that 3M was the commodity of the most use in exchange, it didn't matter whether you actually liked it or not. You were happy to trade the candies you didn't much care for in order to obtain a 3M simply because this could then be traded again for something which really did make your mouth water.

Once the 3M became money, its own value was seen to rise as a consequence. What was occurring was that this extra property of "tradability" was being added to the underlying demand for it as a consumption item.

Indeed, by the end of the session, this value reached such a height that it became an instant legend as, at its peak, one solitary 3M changed hands for no less than three Tootsie Rolls and a Tootsie Pop!

Once this money was settled upon, it became much easier to price such candies as Reese's and Kit Kats, which had previously had an illiquid and uncertain market.

Now they began to sell for one-half and one-quarter of a 3M, despite the fact that they had started out with much the same intrinsic value as a snack item. From there on, their prices hovered within a narrow trading range, roughly comparable to that of a small Tootsie Roll, while Snickers did slightly better than all of them.

Extreme scarcity led to very high prices — anything up to four 3Ms in the case of Jolly Rancher hard candy. Skittles, too, were highly prized and sold for as many five 3Ms. Reese's "Inside Out" sold at a premium over the plain variety.

However, showing that scarcity is not just a numerical concept, the parents of all these kids had long discouraged gum chewing, so despite the gum's similar rarity, no one wanted it.

In fact, the price quickly fell to zero where it was eventually given away free to the one child who was permitted to chew it.

Thankfully for the future of civilization, even that child soon lost interest in it!

Interestingly, the advent of money also encouraged the kids to think beyond the immediate trading round. Instead, they began to acquire a surplus, to be saved for successive rounds where it was hoped better terms might be on offer.

The kids soon adopted different strategies.

Some started saving ("hoarding") 3Ms to trade them in at the end of the trading session, speculating that the goods price of 3M would continually rise.

Others would acquire this valuable thing solely in order to consume it (this money, after all, originated as a consumable good and so it remained).

But mostly — and this was the satisfying part for those anxious to observe the entrepreneurial discovery of money — kids would acquire 3Ms solely to facilitate other exchanges.

Outside observers of a Misesian bent imagined the following: let's say someone arrived at the scene and threw down 100 3Ms on the table. All kids know precisely what would happen. The price of 3Ms would tumble. Each one would purchase far less than it had before.

The "inflation" might be so extreme that 3Ms might even cease to be money — the good everyone wants to acquire in order to acquire other goods — and some other candy might take its place instead.

Imagine the chaos that would ensue, as the kids came loudly to bewail their recent exchanges of worthwhile candy for this now devalued commodity.

Imagine the loss of innocence as they saw honest bargains frustrated and vowed to be more cautious of extending their trust upon the market.

Imagine the general loss as trading once more became scattered and choices were again restricted as the idea of money fell into disrepute.

But, fortunately, no Halloween bogeyman from the Federal Reserve Candy Factory came to ruin their game. So the kids could remain free to trust in the soundness of their candy unit.

At last, the kids became exhausted by this frenzy and the market closed — not because someone sounded a bell, but simply because, in general, everyone came to see that each was as satisfied as they were likely to be with what they had.

This was the Misesian "plain state of rest."

In Mises's words,

people keep on exchanging on the market until no further exchange is possible because no party expects any further improvement of its own conditions from a new act of exchange. The potential buyers consider the prices asked by the potential sellers unsatisfactory, and vice versa. No more transactions take place.

Once the trading had ended, the status of the 3Ms promptly reverted to that of a purely consumable item, since the end of the trading game signaled the loss of their monetary properties, leaving them just a plain candy, much like any other.

Some kids left with a far lesser quantity of candy than when they first arrived, but that did not prevent them feeling far wealthier because now what they owned was a much closer approximation to their ideal mix.

As for the other kids, well, they were astounded to discover that their own bags were far heavier than before, that they too felt wealthier — and that nobody was complaining to mom about the fact!

Indeed, all children left the table with smiles and happiness, each feeling as if he or she had gotten a great deal.

What a stunning achievement!

After all, the available physical resources were unchanged. Nor had anyone planned or policed the trading. It had all happened spontaneously.

One was left wondering at the true magic of that Halloween — namely, at the transforming effect of something as simple as the opportunity for free exchange, for the chance to derive mutual benefit from the difference in tastes between individuals.

In this, at least, Halloween was all about treats, and, despite what the opponents of the exchange economy will tell you, there was no trick about it anywhere you looked.

FOX News Sunday -- Interview with Rush Limbaugh [3/3]

FOX News Sunday -- Interview with Rush Limbaugh [2/3]

FOX News Sunday -- Interview with Rush Limbaugh [1/3]

Barron's Art of Successful Investing Conference

Latest Marc Faber`s video interview dated 10/29/09 at Barron's Art of Successful Investing Conference.


Marc Faber is an international investor known for his uncanny predictions of the stock market and futures markets around the world. Dr. Doom also trades currencies and commodity futures like Gold and Oil.

Dr. Nouriel Roubini

Dr. Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini and Nassim Taleb on CNBC

OK, not exactly. But this clip of the two men asked, not about the world financial crisis, but for stock tips, had the same feel to it. Via Josh Marshall.
We're Governed by Callous Children
Americans feel increasingly disheartened, and our leaders don't even notice.

By PEGGY NOONAN

The new economic statistics put growth at a healthy 3.5% for the third quarter. We should be dancing in the streets. No one is, because no one has any faith in these numbers. Waves of money are sloshing through the system, creating a false rising tide that lifts all boats for the moment. The tide will recede. The boats aren't rising, they're bobbing, and will settle. No one believes the bad time is over. No one thinks we're entering a new age of abundance. No one thinks it will ever be the same as before 2008. Economists, statisticians, forecasters and market specialists will argue about what the new numbers mean, but no one believes them, either. Among the things swept away in 2008 was public confidence in the experts. The experts missed the crash. They'll miss the meaning of this moment, too.

The biggest threat to America right now is not government spending, huge deficits, foreign ownership of our debt, world terrorism, two wars, potential epidemics or nuts with nukes. The biggest long-term threat is that people are becoming and have become disheartened, that this condition is reaching critical mass, and that it afflicts most broadly and deeply those members of the American leadership class who are not in Washington, most especially those in business.

It is a story in two parts. The first: "They do not think they can make it better."

I talked this week with a guy from Big Pharma, which we used to call "the drug companies" until we decided that didn't sound menacing enough. He is middle-aged, works in a significant position, and our conversation turned to the last great recession, in the late mid- to late 1970s and early '80s. We talked about how, in terms of numbers, that recession was in some ways worse than the one we're experiencing now. Interest rates were over 20%, and inflation and unemployment hit double digits. America was in what might be called a functional depression, yet there was still a prevalent feeling of hope. Here's why. Everyone thought they could figure a way through. We knew we could find a path through the mess. In 1982 there were people saying, "If only we get rid of this guy Reagan, we can make it better!" Others said, "If we follow Reagan, he'll squeeze out inflation and lower taxes and we'll be America again, we'll be acting like Americans again." Everyone had a path through.

Now they don't. The most sophisticated Americans, experienced in how the country works on the ground, can't figure a way out. Have you heard, "If only we follow Obama and the Democrats, it will all get better"? Or, "If only we follow the Republicans, they'll make it all work again"? I bet you haven't, or not much.

This is historic. This is something new in modern political history, and I'm not sure we're fully noticing it. Americans are starting to think the problems we are facing cannot be solved.

Part of the reason is that the problems—debt, spending, war—seem too big. But a larger part is that our government, from the White House through Congress and so many state and local governments, seems to be demonstrating every day that they cannot make things better. They are not offering a new path, they are only offering old paths—spend more, regulate more, tax more in an attempt to make us more healthy locally and nationally. And in the long term everyone—well, not those in government, but most everyone else—seems to know that won't work. It's not a way out. It's not a path through.

And so the disheartenedness of the leadership class, of those in business, of those who have something. This week the New York Post carried a report that 1.5 million people had left high-tax New York state between 2000 and 2008, more than a million of them from even higher-tax New York City. They took their tax dollars with them—in 2006 alone more than $4 billion.

You know what New York, both state and city, will do to make up for the lost money. They'll raise taxes.

I talked with an executive this week with what we still call "the insurance companies" and will no doubt soon be calling Big Insura. (Take it away, Democratic National Committee.) He was thoughtful, reflective about the big picture. He talked about all the new proposed regulations on the industry. Rep. Barney Frank had just said on some cable show that the Democrats of the White House and Congress "are trying on every front to increase the role of government in the regulatory area." The executive said of Washington: "They don't understand that people can just stop, get out. I have friends and colleagues who've said to me 'I'm done.'" He spoke of his own increasing tax burden and said, "They don't understand that if they start to tax me so that I'm paying 60%, 55%, I'll stop."

He felt government doesn't understand that business in America is run by people, by human beings. Mr. Frank must believe America is populated by high-achieving robots who will obey whatever command he and his friends issue. But of course they're human, and they can become disheartened. They can pack it in, go elsewhere, quit what used to be called the rat race and might as well be called that again since the government seems to think they're all rats. (That would be you, Chamber of Commerce.)
***

And here is the second part of the story. While Americans feel increasingly disheartened, their leaders evince a mindless . . . one almost calls it optimism, but it is not that.

It is a curious thing that those who feel most mistily affectionate toward America, and most protective toward it, are the most aware of its vulnerabilities, the most aware that it can be harmed. They don't see it as all-powerful, impregnable, unharmable. The loving have a sense of its limits.
More Peggy Noonan

Read Peggy Noonan's previous columns

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When I see those in government, both locally and in Washington, spend and tax and come up each day with new ways to spend and tax—health care, cap and trade, etc.—I think: Why aren't they worried about the impact of what they're doing? Why do they think America is so strong it can take endless abuse?

I think I know part of the answer. It is that they've never seen things go dark. They came of age during the great abundance, circa 1980-2008 (or 1950-2008, take your pick), and they don't have the habit of worry. They talk about their "concerns"—they're big on that word. But they're not really concerned. They think America is the goose that lays the golden egg. Why not? She laid it in their laps. She laid it in grandpa's lap.

They don't feel anxious, because they never had anything to be anxious about. They grew up in an America surrounded by phrases—"strongest nation in the world," "indispensable nation," "unipolar power," "highest standard of living"—and are not bright enough, or serious enough, to imagine that they can damage that, hurt it, even fatally.

We are governed at all levels by America's luckiest children, sons and daughters of the abundance, and they call themselves optimists but they're not optimists—they're unimaginative. They don't have faith, they've just never been foreclosed on. They are stupid and they are callous, and they don't mind it when people become disheartened. They don't even notice.

Chris Christie: 'I'm a Tax Cutter'

The NJ Republican gubernatorial candidate is clearly the low-tax candidate in the race.

With the New Jersey governor's race coming down to the wire, Republican Chris Christie has been criticized for not being specific enough about his tax plans. In an interview with us this week, though, he had plenty to say. "My plan is to lower taxes each and every year that I'm governor," he said. His aim is to reduce the state's tax burden -- now the highest in the nation -- below those of next-door New York and Connecticut. "And we're going to do it over four years," he says.

For now, Mr. Christie offers two tax pledges for his first year: repeal a Corzine property tax hike and allow a Corzine income tax hike to expire. As a result, he says, the top income tax rate would drop back down to 8.9% from 10.75%, and more than a million people would receive property tax rebates. The cost would be roughly $1.5 billion, which he says would be offset with spending cuts.

To be fair, even if Mr. Christie could be pushing a more aggressive agenda to reform the tax-and-spend disaster that is New Jersey, he's clearly the low-tax candidate in the race. Independent candidate Chris Daggett has become semi-famous for his opposition to property taxes, but as Mr. Daggett acknowledged in a recent visit with us, his proposed tax increases are actually larger than his cuts.

Any governor also must contend with a legal mandate for a balanced budget -- currently out of whack by $8 billion. Mr. Christie has been reluctant to forecast where spending cuts would come, but he tells us there's room to cut education without hitting classrooms. The state, he says, has "too many assistant superintendents, too many curriculum directors at the central office."

"I don't think there's any substitute" for tax cuts to spur economic growth, Mr. Christie says, noting that the Tax Foundation ranks the state's business climate as the least-friendly in the nation. "I'd love to see us progress from the absolute bottom to the middle of the pack in a first term. In years two, three and four, we're looking at cutting the corporate business tax, further cuts in the income tax."

As to the charge that he hasn't been closing the sale with New Jersey voters despite their evident eagerness for change, Mr. Christie offers this response: "I'm going to win this race. But I'm not going to tell people just what I think they want to hear if I don't believe that I can absolutely guarantee it's going to happen." New Jersey voters, he adds, have every reason to be a skeptical lot, because "they've been lied to by politicians over and over again."

Mr. Christie predicts that Daggett voters, who can read the polls and know their candidate can only be a spoiler, will mostly vote Republican on Election Day. "I definitely think they go to me," he says.

Bad Manners From a Dictator

The U.N. is outraged at Robert Mugabe's rudeness.

The United Nations is shocked that its torture inspector has been deported from Zimbabwe. "I think I have never been treated by any government in such a rude manner than by the government of Zimbabwe," Manfred Nowak huffed on Thursday.

The special rapporteur for the U.N. Human Rights Council says he is alarmed that an invitation extended to him by Morgan Tsvangirai, Zimbabwe's nominal prime minister, was disregarded by Robert Mugabe's immigration officials. This is not, he protests, in the spirit of February's shaky power-sharing deal between Zimbabwe's dictator and his democratic challenger.

Forgive us if we can't work up the correct degree of outrage at Mr. Nowak's treatment. Mugabe has been abusing, dispossessing, murdering and most recently starving his domestic "enemies" for the better part of 30 years. For much of that time, he was garlanded in so many Western honors it almost seems surprising he didn't win a Nobel Peace Prize.

Even now, despite ongoing EU sanctions, he is being courted at the highest levels. Last month Brussels sent a high-level delegation to Zimbabwe, led by Development Commissioner Karel De Gucht, for talks that included Mugabe. And earlier this month, Madrid said it would use its turn at the rotating EU presidency next year to push for more talks between Brussels and Harare.

Meanwhile, Mugabe's abuses remain unchecked, including attacks on members of Mr. Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change and invasions of still more white-owned commercial farms. But, of course, this is nothing more than what dictators of Mugabe's ilk always do. The wonder of it is that the West keeps knocking on his door, seeking to reason with a man who treats them with the contempt they probably deserve.

Japanese Reform Gets Lost in the Mail

Taxpayers can't afford not to privatize the postal system.

Japan's new cabinet has reversed former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's postal reform and installed an old-guard bureaucrat as its new CEO. These actions are a threat to financial markets, to the living standards of the Japanese people, and to Japan's status as the world's second-largest economy.

Japan Post is one of Japan's largest companies, with 240,000 employees and $3 trillion in assets. Last year it boasted revenue of 20 trillion yen ($220 billion), only slightly behind Toyota. Most importantly, in addition to its postal operations, Japan Post owns a huge bank and a huge insurance company. The bank alone has $2 trillion in deposits, making it the largest savings bank in the world.

For many years, Japan Post was a state-owned enterprise. Four years ago, with an overwhelming popular mandate, Mr. Koizumi decided to privatize it to raise the efficiency of both postal services and investments—efficiency gains that are essential to meet the challenges of an aging population. In October 2007, after an open, nationwide debate and a major political battle that I helped spearhead as a cabinet member, we accomplished our goal. Yoshifumi Nishikawa, the internationally renowned former chairman of Sumitomo Mitsui Bank, was appointed as CEO.

The new government elected in August, led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, promotes itself as favoring the weak and opposes "economic liberalism." As a symbol of the change of policies, it decided to reverse the postal privatization, the most visible symbol of the Koizumi government's reforms. Last week, the government de facto renationalized Japan Post, and hounded Mr. Nishikawa into resigning. Once again, a huge state-owned enterprise has been created in Japan.

david g. klein

The reversal itself wasn't a surprise. Because the DPJ does not have a majority in the Upper House of Parliament, it has formed a coalition with two small parties, the People's National Party and the Social Democratic Party of Japan. Both are hostile to postal privatization. Prime Minister Hatoyama appointed Shizuka Kamei as minister for Postal Services. Mr. Kamei was the poster-boy of the antireform movement during the Koizumi years.

But even taking into consideration the political bias of the new government, the contents of the cabinet decision on postal reform reversal were more extreme than expected.

First, the Postal Savings Bank, the largest depository institution in the world, will be exempted from provisions of the Banking Act, to allow the bank to give special service to rural areas and other areas suffering from economic decline. The new measures mean that there will no longer be uniform regulation of banks in Japan. This unlevel playing field will give the Postal Bank an unfair advantage over private-sector competitors and distort resource allocation. It also threatens to turn the Postal Bank into a captive for absorbing huge fiscal deficits, without the market discipline that stems from borrowing in open markets.

Second, the new measures call for the Postal Bank to give "special consideration" to small businesses, in effect forcing the postal system's lending operations to extend credit on a noncommercial basis. This is a de facto revival of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, which in the past was used as a backdoor way for fiscal bureaucrats and legislators to fund pet projects (such as three—count them, three!—Golden Gate-class bridges to Shikoku Island) with little to no oversight. This is a major reversal of the Koizumi reforms, which sought to end such pork.

Third, the government has decided to freeze the public offering of Japan Post shares. The DPJ promised to do this in their election campaign earlier this year. This is a major reversal, given that the Koizumi government had planned to divest all of the shares of the Postal Savings Bank and the Postal Life Insurance Company—the financial arms of the postal system—within 10 years, and two-thirds of the shares of the Japan Postal Delivery System within 10 years. (Given the public role of postal delivery, we had planned to for the government to retain one-third of the shares of the latter.)

These three reversals imply that the government will effectively return the postal system to the status of a state-owned enterprise and use it for political patronage. Without doubt, these measures will raise the long-term burden on the taxpayer. Even today, the cost to post letters in Japan is double that of the United States. Such inefficiencies show precisely why it was necessary to raise postal efficiency and make the financial parts of the post office independent, and thus to raise its enterprise value.

More broadly, competition in all areas that the post-office services—postal services, banking and insurance—would have revitalized the Japanese economy as a whole. However, the government's new measures will turn the clock back 10 years. While it may look like the government is trying to help the weak, in fact the people of Japan will bear enormous costs, both directly and indirectly, because inefficiencies will block the best use of the very scarce resources of an aging economy. The aged and the weak will suffer most from this resource waste.

The reversal also clarifies another key problem of the new administration: opaque cabinet decision-making. Japan Post has a huge impact on Japan's economy and society. The Koizumi government produced its policy on postal reform after a year of open deliberation, with full disclosure of meeting minutes. Mr. Hatoyama's government, by contrast, made these far-reaching decisions in a week, with no clarity of either process or reasoning. The appointment of the new president, Jiro Saito, was not only opaque, but flew in the face of DPJ election promise to end the appointment of former bureaucrats to public enterprises.

Policy decisions in any new government will inevitably be somewhat confused. However, the decision to reverse postal privatization shows just how inadequate the cabinet's internal controls really are—and how little attention is being paid to economic reform. Japan already suffered one "lost decade." The reversal of postal reform puts Japan on track to lose yet another.

Mr. Takenaka is director of the Global Security Research Institute at Keio University and was formerly minister of economics, minister of financial reform and minister of internal affairs and communications under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

President What's-His-Name

President What's-His-Name

Tony Blair is too big for Europe's Lilliputs.

The Lisbon Treaty appears to be on the cusp of final ratification, and with it Brussels will gain something it has long sought—a President of the European Union. That in turn may finally answer Henry Kissinger's famous question about what number to call to reach "Europe."

But this only raises a second question: When that president calls other world leaders, will they pick up the phone? Probably not, if Europe's most ardent federalists get their way. Apparently afraid of the shadow they have worked so long to cast, EU stalwarts like the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg fear that the appointment of a genuine political heavyweight might not be in their interests after all.

Instead, Europe's Lilliputs are pushing to fill the job with one of their own. Consider Luxembourg's Jean-Claude Juncker. By all accounts, Mr. Juncker has run that Grand Duchy of nearly half a million people without incident for 14 years. But would a Juncker presidency make it more likely that Barack Obama or Hu Jintao would call him when they needed to speak to "Europe," as opposed to Nicolas Sarkozy or Angela Merkel?

Or take Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, whose main credential seems to be the overwhelming dullness associated with him. "The Netherlands is middle of the road. It is neither big or small, nor is it north or south or east or west. It is solid middle ground on which to negotiate," an unnamed diplomat recently told Reuters in support of his candidacy.

And let us not forget former Irish President Mary Robinson, who has also served as U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. Whatever her expertise, she remains, at best, the second person the world thinks of when they hear the words "Mrs. Robinson."

Alternatives to these names would be such genuinely global figures as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair or former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. Both are political heavyweights who know their way around the world and would require no introductions in Beijing, Washington, Moscow, Brasilia, Cairo or Jerusalem. But among Europe's duchys, they suffer from their unblinking support for the U.S. and especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Mr. Aznar sits on the board of News Corp., which owns the Journal, but we admired him long before that.)

The irony is that the fears of a strong EU President aren't entirely misplaced: This is not an elected position, and the majority of Europe's half-billion people have had no say in creating the job. Nor is it clear why one person should be entitled to speak for every citizen from Porto to Warsaw. But this is an argument against the Lisbon Treaty itself. And now that the ship has (nearly) sailed, selecting a leader unlikely to offend by virtue of his inability to be recognized seems a poor way of setting things right.

News Hub: Anxiety Returns to Market

Government Paymasters

Henninger: Obama and the Old Hat People

Honduras 1, Hillary 0

A Honduran compromise provides Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with an elegant diplomatic exit.

The big news in Honduras is that the good guys seem to have won a four-month political standoff over the exile of former President Manuel Zelaya. Current President Roberto Micheletti agreed yesterday to submit Mr. Zelaya's request for reinstatement as president to the Supreme Court and Congress, and in return the U.S. will withdraw its sanctions and recognize next month's presidential elections.

Mr. Zelaya, whose term would have expired in January, isn't likely to be reinstated, given that the court has twice ruled against his right to remain in office. The Honduran Congress, which voted in June to remove Mr. Zelaya, will then use that high court's opinion to decide if he should be restored to power.

There is a risk that Venezeula's Hugo Chávez and other Zelaya allies will try to buy support for their man and stir other trouble. But Hondurans who have rightly stood up to enormous U.S. pressure to reinstate Mr. Zelaya aren't likely to be intimidated now.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton trumpeted the result as a diplomatic triumph, but it's more accurate to say that it extricated her and the Obama Administration from the box canyon they entered by throwing in with Mr. Zelaya. Hondurans had deposed Mr. Zelaya on entirely legal grounds for threatening violence and violating the country's constitution in an attempt to run for a second term. The U.S. nonetheless meddled and demanded that Mr. Zelaya be reinstated.

But Hondurans refused to bend, and the State Department apparently decided at last that Honduras was going to go ahead with its election whether the U.S. agreed or not. The Honduran compromise provided Mrs. Clinton with an elegant diplomatic exit.

Washington and the Organization of American States have now promised to send observers and recognize the elections; there will be no amnesty for Mr. Zelaya if he is charged with a crime; and the zelayistas will renounce their plans to call for a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution. If Mrs. Clinton wants to call this a victory, it is—for Honduras.

Is the Stock Exchange Obsolete?

The CEO of the NYSE says the future of New York as a financial center will largely be determined by Washington.

In the late 18th century there was a buttonwood tree in lower Manhattan where brokers gathered to trade stocks. But by 1817, the tree had become obsolete as a trading hub. The traders migrated indoors and changed the name of their group to the New York Stock and Exchange Board. The exchange moved a couple of more times after that, and in 1903 the NYSE opened for business in the neoclassical masterpiece that still stands at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets.

Today a giant American flag stretches across the tall Corinthian columns of that elegant design—the very symbol of American economic freedom. Yet even as hordes of out-of-towners stroll by daily on tours of New York's financial landmarks, it sometimes seems that international finance is leaving the bricks and mortar behind.

With the advent of electronic markets, equities trading now largely happens in cyberspace. That fact raises the question of whether New York, with its high taxes and high-priced real estate, still makes sense as a financial center. Equally uncertain is whether the Big Board's legendary Wall Street address should be included in the profitable 21st century business model of the company, which is now known as NYSE-Euronext because of its acquisition of a European trading business in 2007. Is 11 Wall St. destined for the same fate as that buttonwood tree?

Zina Saunders

Recently I went to see Duncan Niederauer, the company's CEO, with these questions on my mind. Mr. Niederauer has only been at the helm of NYSE-Euronext since 2007. But he is no stranger to the equities markets, having spent 20 years in the equities division at Goldman Sachs.

The NYSE used to have a visitors gallery that allowed tourists to peer down on traders scurrying around the floor. But all that changed on Sept. 11, 2001. The exchange is no longer open to the public, and when I arrived at its doors I had to navigate a gauntlet of heavy metal barricades, stroll past a couple of machine-gun-toting guards, and clear a metal detector before I was escorted into the CEO's office. As it turns out, access for tourists is not the only thing that has changed in recent years. Things on the floor are a lot different, too.

I begin the interview with the broader question about New York as a financial center. Is it in decline?

That, the CEO tells me without hesitating, is largely up to our federal politicians.

"New York City's ability to compete is largely out of its immediate sphere of influence," he says. "A lot is going to have to do with what changes come out of Washington and what their regulatory and legislative response to the crisis is." Washington's response is "going to determine New York's ability to continue to compete in a world that we all know is in the process of a pretty transformational rebalancing."

The large German insurer Allianz recently announced that it would delist in New York. I wonder aloud if that isn't a bad sign. Mr. Niederauer is matter of fact, calling Allianz's decision "rational," and consistent with similar decisions made by other European companies.

"If you turn the clock back 20 or 30 years," he says, "it made a tremendous amount of sense for companies like Allianz to list in the United States because their local market was not deep, it was not liquid, it was not easily accessed by investors outside the immediate jurisdiction. So if those companies had multinational aspirations for either brand awareness, shareholder involvement or both, the only way to diversify the shareholder base was to list in the biggest capital market in the world, which was the United States. The NYSE won virtually every one of those listings."

Now, it's a different story. The "local market is a lot deeper, a lot more liquid, and it's much easier to invest cross-border than it was 20 years ago. All the big mutual funds here have no trouble and have plenty of flexibility in their charters to enable them to invest in the local markets." As a result, Mr. Niederauer says, Allianz's decision makes sense. But he quickly adds two important points.

First, the good news: There are nearly 70 Chinese companies now listed on the NYSE. "Those have all come in the last few years" and "for the same reasons that the Allianzes of the world came here 20 or 30 years ago." So far, the Chinese domestic market "is not developed, liquid or deep enough," which draws companies to the U.S.

The bad news, according to Mr. Niederauer, is that while Allianz had some legitimate reasons to delist, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley law may very well have been the nail in the coffin. The act—which increased the reporting burden on companies—is "one of the things that has made us less competitive," and "hurt the U.S. capital markets competitiveness."

How so? He says some companies "use it as a differentiator because they don't have a strong reputation and don't come from markets with solid regulatory oversight." But "I'm afraid in the case of companies like Allianz, it's a drag," because complying with Sarbanes-Oxley ends up costing companies a lot of money. It is worth noting, he adds, that though five Russian companies are listed in New York, not one has been added since 2004.

The CEO says small companies are especially suffering under Sarbanes-Oxley. When Congress passed the act, it was "meant to be fairly cost-effective for a small company with a fairly simple business model to comply."

But it hasn't turned out that way. "If we surveyed 100 small companies with market caps of less than half a billion dollars, let's say, I think they would all tell you, 'yes we know we were told it was only supposed to cost 75 or 100 thousand dollars a year to comply.' But most of them would say it costs about 10 times that. And that's an awful big burden for a small company to bear."

"Why aren't more smaller companies launching initial public offerings?" He quickly answers his own question: "The threshold is getting higher and higher because of all the costs associated with being a publicly listed company. A lot of that is the fear of what these things are going to cost, the creep of expense to comply with these various regulations." Even with Sarbanes-Oxley being relaxed a bit, Mr. Niederauer says the exchange still suffers from the perception of heavy regulation.

Listings, of course, are not NYSE-Euronext's only source of income. In the second quarter, revenues from listings accounted for only 17% of the total—about the same proportion as revenue from "market data" services. That's because Mr. Niederauer and John Thain, his predecessor, anticipated the fact that competitiveness in a global capital market would increasingly depend on deriving income from other products and places outside of the U.S.

In the same second quarter, derivatives trading amounted to 26% of revenue. That includes trading in American Stock Exchange options, which NYSE-Euronext acquired in 2008, and options traded through the exchange's electronic trading platform known as NYSE-Arca. Even more significantly, most of the derivatives income is generated at the LIFFE, an electronic trading platform with operations based in London.

All of this demonstrates that NYSE-Euronext executives have been able to read the electronic tape on the wall. But it's one thing to invest in Europe and cyberspace. It is quite another to argue that the historic venue in lower Manhattan retains its raison d'être.

The traditional NYSE model—using specialists to make markets—worked fine for decades because the Big Board had a near monopoly on U.S. equity trading. But now most trades are executed electronically and markets are open 24 hours around the globe. How can Mr. Niederauer still justify "the floor"? He argues that the New York floor offers customers something that computers are incapable of providing: "the human touch."

Though he doesn't want to "overplay the hand of the floor," he maintains that having people executing trades on high volatility days gives the NYSE-Euronext an edge. "I view it as having a real-time lever where we can apply as much human judgment in an individual situation or on an individual day as is required."

He says NYSE-Euronext's combination of cutting-edge technology and human judgment is "an invaluable combination that no one else can replicate. I can't do that without the floor." And because the NYSE-Euronext has expanded the products that can be traded there—adding options, Nasdaq stocks, derivatives, European stocks—some agency firms have actually added personnel recently and decided "to run their whole business from here."

Listening to the CEO promote his company, I begin to feel somewhat more optimistic than I did when I walked in. Maybe my all-time favorite New York institution—not counting the Cyclone roller coaster at Coney Island—can survive after all.

Then we circle back to the subject of regulation, and the dark clouds return. Mr. Niederauer says Washington is casting a shadow of uncertainty over the market. Exhibit A is the possibility that "the boardroom and corporate governance" could be "federalized." And he warns that "we don't need acts of Congress to talk to us about what board composition or decentralization should look like."

He is relieved that it appears Congress has shelved its plans to tax multinationals headquartered in the U.S. on their non-U.S. profits that are not repatriated. That, he says, would have been "a competitive disadvantage for U.S. companies," which could have had "knock-on effects in the U.S. capital markets." But he remains concerned about the "transaction tariff on all transactions in the regulated markets" that's currently being bandied about. "It would have disastrous consequences."

At bottom, Mr. Niederauer is worried about what government is doing to risk takers. "It was striking if not staggering that virtually no companies [backed by venture capital] came to market last year. I didn't want to hear that it was just because the market was bumpy and valuations weren't that good." He says that until late in the year that was not a valid excuse.

Though the initial offering "pipeline" is now stronger than it's been in two years, he worries about keeping the "virtuous circle" healthy. Remember how it's supposed to work: "the entrepreneur gets rewarded for taking personal risk, borrowing capital, taking an idea, starting a new business from scratch. That's America the last time I checked. When they get big enough, they've proved the idea works, they want to grow, they come to the equity market because it's an efficient way to raise more capital to grow and the next thing you know Microsoft starts in a recession and now employs 95,000 people around the world, 25 to 30 years later. That's America, that's what we're supposed to stand for, and if we're not careful that virtuous circle is going to go backward and it's going to be a vicious circle."

Small companies, he argues, are the key to the recovery. "They're the economic engine in this country, certainly after every recession. That's where most of the new job creation comes from. I think we're all a little nervous that if we start to convey that risk-taking is no longer okay, what impact does that have on entrepreneurial spirit and innovation?"

In 2008, the NYSE had one venture-capital backed company come to market all year. "That's not good," he says. Not good for the NYSE-Euronext, not good for New York, and not good for America.

Ms. O'Grady writes the Journal's Americas column.

Karzai Rival Won't Participate in Runoff

Karzai Rival Won't Participate in Runoff

KABUL -- Afghanistan's presidential challenger Abdullah Abdullah said he won't take part in the Nov. 7 runoff election because the vote will be neither fair nor free, handing a victory -- if not a clear mandate to govern -- to incumbent President Hamid Karzai.

Dr. Abdullah's decision dealt another blow to the credibility of the electoral process that was supposed to bring Afghanistan a stable, legitimate government that could tackle a spreading Taliban insurgency just as the Obama administration is considering sending tens of thousands of additional troops here.

[Abdullah Abdullah] Reuters

Afghan presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah said he won't take part in the second round of the country's controversial election.

But it didn't necessarily mean that the runoff, which is likely to spark new Taliban attacks, will be aborted. Mr. Karzai said he wanted to press ahead with the vote that would finally give him a clear majority, even if he ran unopposed.

The U.S. and its Western allies that maintain 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, and the United Nations, which played a key role in the elections, view such a second round as an unnecessary waste of money and probably lives, diplomats say. "There is a lot of pressure behind the scenes on Karzai not to go to a runoff," said a senior Western diplomat. "But he just doesn't want to accept a victory by default, a victory that has not been gained in the field."

Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission, a body appointed by Mr. Karzai, initially certified that the president won 54.6% of the votes in the August first round. Last month, a U.N.-led watchdog disqualified nearly one third of the votes cast for Mr. Karzai as fraudulent, implicating many IEC officials in ballot-stuffing on his behalf. That decision pushed Mr. Karzai's total below 50% and triggered the runoff.

Citing that fraud, Dr. Abdullah demanded that Mr. Karzai fire senior IEC officials by Saturday, a demand that the president declined to fulfill. Talks between the two camps on possible power-sharing and avoiding fraud failed to produce a result, prompting Dr. Abdullah to announce that he's bowing out of the race as he stood behind a sign proclaiming: "No government without an election can be stable or lawful."

"The IEC is not independent," Dr. Abdullah said, his eyes welling up. "Everyone knows it is biased in favor of the incumbent, and the incumbent is misusing government resources." IEC officials have repeatedly denied they favor Mr. Karzai. Mr. Karzai has insisted no largescale fraud was perpetrated on his behalf.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said over the weekend that Dr. Abdullah's pullout wouldn't affect Mr. Karzai's legitimacy. "When President Karzai accepted the second round without knowing what the consequences and outcome would be, that bestowed legitimacy from that moment forward, and Dr. Abdullah's decision does not in any way take away from that," Mrs. Clinton said during a visit to Israel.

Mr. Karzai's campaign said in a statement on Sunday that it regretted Dr. Abdullah's decision to abandon the race. "We had hoped that he could have completed the runoff and helped strengthen the foundations of democracy and rule of law in the country," the statement said.

In a separate interview with U.S.-funded Radio Azadi, Mr. Karzai said that "as an Afghan citizen and a candidate I hope the runoff takes place," according to a transcript provided by the presidential palace in Kabul. "I will take the next step in accordance to the constitution of the country and I am ready to accept any decision by the IEC. If the constitution says that there should be an election we have to hold the election and elect our president," Mr. Karzai added.

If the election goes ahead, Dr. Abdullah's name will remain on the ballots that have already been distributed throughout the country. The politician, who served as foreign minister under Mr. Karzai, said that he didn't file the paperwork needed to formally withdraw his candidacy because he suspended any cooperation with the IEC. He also didn't urge his followers to boycott the vote.

"I leave the choice to my followers and supporters, based on what they see as the best interest of the country," Dr. Abdullah said, adding that he asked his backers to remain calm and avoid any violence.

There was no visible reaction to this electoral drama on the streets of Kabul, as ordinary Afghans paid little attention to the complicated political intrigues that kept Afghan and Western officials busy for weeks. The Taliban, which carried out several deadly attacks during the first round and stormed a Kabul guesthouse housing U.N. election workers last week, have repeatedly pledged to disrupt any runoff by killing election officials and voters. With so little at stake, the turnout in a runoff is likely to be even lower than the estimated 40% of eligible voters who participated in the August first round.

"The big question is whether the international community will want to spend millions of dollars and provide security for the runoff if it is just a symbolic exercise," said Haroun Mir, director of the Kabul-based Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Studies. "If the turnout is very low, it could hurt Karzai's legitimacy and be a victory for Abdullah."

The Afghan constitution doesn't spell out what must happen when a runoff candidate bows out, and any decision by the IEC is likely to end up in Afghanistan's Supreme Court -- which consistently ruled in favor of Mr. Karzai in previous disputes.

Some IEC officials said that they expected legal specialists to advise them to move ahead with the Nov. 7 round. "The constitution says that there must be a runoff, and that is true regardless of whether Abdullah runs," said Daoud Ali Najafi, the commission's day-to-day executive.

But the IEC chairman, Azizullah Ludin, said that no decision has been made, and that the election commission will meet with constitutional experts before deciding whether to hold the runoff, making a formal announcement Monday afternoon.

In the hours before Dr. Abdullah's pullout, Western diplomats pressed him to end his participation in the race in a dignified manner. They asked him to resist pressure from hard-line supporters to call for a boycott, and to leave open the possibility of eventually reconciling with Mr. Karzai.

Dr. Abdullah satisfied these requests, saying at Sunday's press conference that "the door should be open" for possible cooperation with Mr. Karzai.

In a statement, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul endorsed Dr. Abdullah's "emphasis on national unity," and said that it awaits the next steps in the process. Separately, the chief U.N. official in the country, Kai Eide, praised Dr. Abdullah's "statesmanlike and dignified" behavior.

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