Lebanon's Fateful Showdown

By Amir Taheri

Within the next week or so, we'll know whether Iran (acting through proxies in Beirut) will trigger a new civil war in Lebanon.

The issue is the choice of a replacement for President Emil Lahoud, imposed by Syria during its occupation of Lebanon. His term of office expires Nov. 23.

Tehran's favorite for the job is ex-Gen. Michel Aoun, a maverick Maronite Christian politician. He is allied with the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah - whose leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has publicly threatened violence if the Iranian candidate does not win.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Republic president, sees the Lebanese election as a showdown with the United States and a potential blow at the Bush Doctrine of spreading democracy in the Middle East.

But a majority of the members of the Lebanese National Assembly - the parliament that has the task of choosing the president - refuse the Iranian choice. The so-called 14 March coalition of moderate forces backs two candidates, former diplomat Nassib Lahoud and ex-Defense Minister Butros Harb. (The moderates have also indicated that they might consider other compromise candidates, such as banker Joseph Tarbayh and former Finance Minister Damianus Qattar.)

Meanwhile, Syria, although an Iranian client, appears to have some reservations about Aoun. (The general once fought Syrian occupation with support from the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.) Damascus has indicated it might settle for a compromise in the person of Riad Salamah, the governor of the Central Bank.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner sought a compromise among the Lebanese parties - an agreement on a list of six or seven candidates acceptable to both the majority and the pro-Iran opposition in the parliament.

Under the Lebanese Constitution, the presidency must come from the Maronite Christian community. (The jobs of prime minister and parliamentary speaker are allotted to the Sunni and Shia Muslims.) So Kouchner suggested that the "compromise list" be established by Cardinal Antoine Sfeir, the Maronites' spiritual head. Sfeir came up with a list of six names (including both Aoun and Lahoud). But he won't make the list public until he receives written guarantees from all parties that they'll abide by the results of the election.

And the Aounites and their Hezbollah allies have so far refused to provide the written consent.

The election has split almost all of Lebanon's various ethnic and religious communities. Most Christians want a president who would symbolize Lebanon's independence from both Iran and Syria. A majority of the Sunni Muslims and almost all of the Druze community share that desire.

But the Shiite community - almost 40 percent of the population - is split between Hezbollah, which follows the Iranian line under all circumstances, and the Amal Movement, led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

Recently, Berri has manifested a surprising degree of statesmanship by trying to promote a compromise and reduce the threat of civil war. Although close to Tehran, Berri prefers Syria as the major foreign power with influence in Lebanon. But can he distance himself from Hezbollah?

Some analysts believe that Berri can't afford to antagonize Hezbollah, whose well-funded political machine could crush Amal in a short time. But Hezbollah clearly needs Berri as a legitimizing cover.

It would especially need him if Tehran decides to reject the result of the election and calls for a prolongation of Emil Lahoud's term, through the appointment of a new government, until new parliamentary elections are held. This would amount to a coup d'etat, and would be rejected by the democratic majority.

It would be impossible for a puppet government named by Lahoud to assert its authority, let alone organize general elections for a new parliament (which, in turn, would choose the next president). Lebanon could end up with two governments, a sure recipe for civil war.

The Lebanese election has received little attention in the West. In the Middle East, however, it's seen as a major showdown between the region's U.S.-backed democratic forces and radical movements sponsored by the Islamic Republic in Iran. A clear win for one side would be a decisive defeat for the other.

"This is something that cannot be spun or fudged," says one politician whose name appears on Sfeir's list. "Everyone will know who has won: Iran or the United States. Tehran hopes to write the tombstone of the Bush Doctrine in Lebanon."

A win by Iran in Lebanon would do three things:

* It would compensate for the political setbacks the Islamic Republic has suffered in Iraq. Pro-Tehran forces have failed to seize control of southern Iraq and have been pushed on the defensive in Baghdad.

* It would confirm Ahmadinejad's claim that the United States is preparing that "last helicopter" in which to flee from the Middle East as soon as President Bush is out of the White House.

The Islamic Republic's intransigence on the nuclear issue and its decision to ignore two resolutions of the UN Security Council are based on that assumption.

* It would strengthen Ahmadinejad in his power struggle against rivals in the Khomeinist establishment just four months before a crucial general election.

Syria, France and a number of moderate Arab states want neither the United States nor Iran to win and are hoping for a draw - which would mean the election of a neutral, and possibly ineffectual character, as Lebanon's next president. That, however, would be a loss for Lebanon and its democratic aspirations.