Cartel That Couldn't Suddenly Can — Thanks To U.S. Shortsightedness

By ROBERT SAMUELSON |

For much of its 47-year existence, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries has been a cartel in name only. It could not control oil prices because many of its members regularly breached the production quotas that were intended to regulate the market.

So OPEC followed oil prices up and down, as supply and demand shifted. But now OPEC may be the real deal: a cartel that works. If so, that's bad news for the rest of the world.

Look no further than last week's OPEC meeting in Vienna. Oil ministers declined to increase production despite a strong case for doing so. Not only were oil prices fluttering above $100 a barrel, but the U.S. is either in or near a recession and much of the rest of the world faces an economic slowdown.

What's wrong is that a fall of oil prices is one of the mechanisms by which a recession or economic slowdown corrects itself. Lower prices for gasoline, home heating oil and diesel fuel improve consumer purchasing power. They muffle inflation and increase confidence. In this sense, they're an important "automatic stabilizer" for a faltering economy.

Oil producers don't much care. High prices have been good to them. Since 1999, annual oil revenues for OPEC countries have more than quadrupled, to an estimated $670 billion in 2007, says energy economist Philip Verleger Jr.

What's less clear is whether OPEC has merely benefited from tight oil markets or has acted as a true cartel, restricting output and raising prices. The right answer is: both.

Of tight markets, there's little doubt. Two massive oil miscalculations both aided OPEC.

First was a widespread underestimate of world demand, especially from China. Since 1999, China's oil use has almost doubled, to 7.5 million barrels a day (mbd) in 2007. (In 2007, world oil use was 86 mbd, up 13% from 1999. American oil use was 20.8 mbd, up 7%.)

Second was an overestimate of supply. War, civil strife and nationalization have depressed production in Iraq, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela and elsewhere. Total global capacity might be 4.5 mbd higher without these setbacks, says the Energy Policy Research Foundation (EPRINC).

But that's only the half of it. Go back to late 2006. Crude prices were slipping from about $70 a barrel in August toward $50 a barrel. A true cartel would cut production to prop up prices. That's what OPEC did.

In two steps, it reduced oil output by about 800,000 barrels a day, notes economist Larry Goldstein of EPRINC. "By July, 125 million barrels of oil inventory had been wiped out," he says. At the end of 2007, inventories (measured by days of supply) were at their lowest point in three years. Prices rose.

OPEC's present market power dates to early 1999, says economist Verleger. Oil prices then were about $10 a barrel. The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis had cut demand; supply was essentially unregulated. Saudi Arabia undertook frantic negotiations with other major producers, including Iran, Kuwait, Venezuela and non-OPEC members Russia, Norway and Mexico.

The result was an agreement to cut production sharply. Compliance with output quotas was surprisingly good; countries were terrified by the collapse of their oil revenues.

We are paying for past shortsightedness. Dependence on oil imports, now almost 60% of U.S. supply, is inevitable. But we could limit OPEC's market power by curbing our demand and increasing our supply.

As the worldwide gap between supply and demand rises, it's harder for producers to control the market. More have spare capacity; more are tempted to increase production to raise revenues. Today's surplus is concentrated in a few countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which can adjust production to influence prices.

Americans rant at foreign producers on the silly presumption that they should subordinate their interests to ours. But we refuse to do much that would actually limit their freedom of action.

It was only last year that Congress raised fuel-efficiency standards for new cars and light trucks. We have steadfastly rejected higher gasoline taxes to curb unnecessary driving and strengthen demand for fuel-efficient vehicles (better to tax ourselves than let foreigners tax us through higher prices). And we have consistently restricted oil drilling in Alaska and elsewhere.

By doing so little to check its own thirst for imports, the U.S. has contributed to OPEC's present triumph. The extent of that triumph will be tested this year and next. Non-OPEC oil supplies — from Brazil, Canada and Kazakhstan, among other places — will increase.

Meanwhile, a weaker global economy may dampen demand. Even OPEC may be unable to hold prices at today's high levels. Whatever happens, the long-term threat of a global oil cartel will remain.

We should be taking the hard steps to limit its power. Considering our past complacency, we probably won't.