Afghanistan

A changing war

The conflict in Afghanistan may become more like the one in Iraq

THE Mujahideen Day parade in Kabul, at the weekend, was supposed to show Afghanistan’s new, Western-trained, armed forces coming of age. President Hamid Karzai, other Afghan politicians and a jumble of diplomats packed a podium to review the troops. Then, just as a 21-gun salute began, what sounded like celebratory firecrackers crackled from a shabby hotel some 400m away. As six lightly armed Taliban fighters took pot shots the dignitaries and military men panicked, shedding bits of ceremonial uniform as they scrambled for safety.

Casualties were not as serious as they might have been: the gunmen managed to kill three and wound 11 but failed to touch their main target, Mr Karzai. Even so, they scored a significant propaganda victory. Television pictures of the furore broadcast at home and abroad confirmed that Afghanistan’s capital is within reach of the Islamist fighters. “We can attack anywhere we want to”, boasted a Taliban spokesman after the attacks. This was the second big strike in Kabul this year. In January a three-man Taliban suicide squad blasted its way into the lobby and spa of a luxury hotel in the city, killing eight staff and guests.

The latest event could have been worse. Western intelligence services claim that another more sophisticated assault planned for the same day, that would have involved several suicide-bombers, was thwarted. It is said that other big attacks have been foiled in Kabul too. Such claims are hardly reassuring. It appears that the Taliban are intensively adopting new methods, including the sort of terrorist assaults long-seen in Iraq.

Optimists point out that Afghanistan’s government remains relatively stable and, despite recent setbacks in Kabul, that there is no evidence of a jump in Taliban capability. It seems likely that in August, as scheduled, Afghan forces will take on responsibility for security around the capital. That would be a symbolic first step towards the eventual reduction in the number of Western soldiers in the country, which the commander of NATO forces, General Dan McNeill, wants to begin in 2011.

But there are reasons for caution. Recent suggestions from some Western officials that the Taliban are crumbling look to be exaggerated. Overall Taliban violence is rising. The nature of confrontations is changing too. Casualties among Western forces are increasingly caused by “asymmetric warfare”, such as roadside bombs and suicide attacks, rather than by conventional battles. This time last year such assaults caused 44% of casualties, now the figure is more like 80%. At the same time injuries to Western soldiers are dramatically down: from 187 in the first quarter of last year, to 99 this year. That suggests the Taliban forces are eschewing firefights in favour of terrorist-style attacks.

If so, that is a rational move on the Islamists’ part. In conventional battles with Western forces the Taliban forces were estimated to be losing 15 fighters, at least, for every NATO soldier killed. A switch to an asymmetric model, as has proven effective for Iraq’s insurgents, has looked likely for some time. The weekend attack in Kabul fits within that evolving strategy. Such assaults require few resources, but can shape public opinion.

Beyond the capital, too, the Taliban have a strategy designed to build opposition to both foreign armed forces and to often unpopular local Afghan official structures. Grievances over ineffective or corrupt government, the intensification of local disputes and resentment against foreign armies all have the potential to turn public sentiment against rule from Kabul. In much of the country, at least, Taliban leaders may have decided that fighting set-piece battles is a costly strategy, whereas carrying out hit-and-run attacks is enough to keep the war going. After that, it may just be a matter of waiting: their best hope may be to outlast rather than outdo the West.