The Ma Ying-jeou Era

By SHELLEY RIGGER
FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA

Tomorrow's inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan could mark the beginning of a new era in Asia-Pacific history. For more than half a century, conflict between Taiwan and mainland China has clouded the region's future and fueled fears that the U.S. and China -- two nuclear powers -- might be drawn into war. But as Chinese President Hu Jintao said at the Boao Forum last month, the change of leadership in Taiwan represents a "historic opportunity" to relax tensions and replace conflict with cooperation.

Ken Fallin

Mr. Ma will be the first president in Taiwan's post-war history to make pragmatism the guiding principle in the island's mainland policy. Under Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, Taipei clung to its goal of taking back the mainland from Communist domination. In the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui abandoned that approach, but the two sides' lingering mutual suspicion poisoned the budding cross-Strait dialogue. When Chen Shui-bian was elected in 2000, Beijing rejected his early overtures, effectively pushing him into the arms of Taiwan's pro-independence faction for political support at home.

In contrast to his predecessors, Mr. Ma has come to power on a platform that emphasizes Taiwan's and China's shared interests, even while maintaining a commitment to "put Taiwan first." Mr. Ma rejects the independence faction's Sinophobic outlook. His campaign platform promised to improve economic and political relations with Beijing. This centrist path seeks to maximize Taiwan's economic opportunities by exploiting synergies between the two sides' economies. He has promised to open direct flights, ease investment restrictions, reduce tariffs and facilitate currency exchanges.

None of which is to say he's "soft" on the core issue of Taiwan's democratic identity. He believes Taiwan must not unify with a non-democratic China, and he puts teeth in his position by defining democracy to include reversing the verdicts against 1989's Tiananmen Square protesters. Mr. Ma has said unification will be off the table as a negotiating topic during his presidency, and he has made it clear in countless ways that Taiwan is his homeland, the country he has been elected to represent and to lead.

Taiwanese, for their part, are also eager to end the tension and enhance economic cooperation. Only a small (albeit noisy) minority still wants to push for formal independence. While most islanders wish Taiwan enjoyed more international recognition, they are not prepared to sacrifice peace and democracy to get it. They harbor little ill will toward China, but they see little benefit in formalizing a political relationship between the two.

Mr. Ma's party has already laid the groundwork for discussions that could effectively preserve the status quo. In a 2005 pact, Mr. Ma's Kuomintang party and the Chinese Communist Party agreed to use the "1992 Consensus" -- an agreement between Taipei and Beijing on the concept of one China, without a clear definition of what that would mean in practice -- as the basis for future negotiations. The 1992 Consensus is more a fig leaf to cover the two sides' differences than an agreement on principles. But it's a very handy fig leaf if it can get the two sides talking.

Add it all up, and Beijing has an opportunity to start improving cross-Strait relations, as long as it acts with flexibility and confidence. The most welcome gesture Beijing could make in response to Mr. Ma's inauguration would be to loosen the noose it has tied around Taiwan's international participation. Doing so would give Mr. Ma political room at home for a further thaw in ties. Many Taiwanese view Beijing as hostile to Taiwan; they need to see that Beijing will treat a government in Taipei that does not challenge Beijing's interests as a friend. This is especially true of the 42% of Taiwanese voters who did not support Mr. Ma and might worry he wouldn't stick up for Taiwan's interests.

Such concessions don't need to be excessively painful for a confident Beijing. For example, Mr. Ma has called for a "diplomatic truce" whereby the two sides would stop expanding their diplomatic partnerships at one another's expense. This is a good start. Beijing also could show good will by ending its opposition to Taiwan's participation in non-statehood-based international organizations. Eventually, Beijing should reduce its military threat as well -- especially short-range ballistic missile deployments opposite Taiwan. Given that Taiwan does not pose a military threat of its own to China, and that Mr. Ma's government is highly unlikely to make any provocative declaration of independence, the presence of these weapons opposite Taiwan's shores is needlessly inflammatory.

Mr. Ma's inauguration presents a chance neither Taiwan nor China can afford to pass up. Doing so will benefit not only them but their friends and neighbors. Instability in the Strait has been a major security problem in the region for years. Remember that one of America's most significant naval mobilizations shows of naval force in the Pacific in the past two decades -- in 1996 -- came in response to cross-Strait tensions. The two sides owe it to themselves, and their region, to seize the opportunity they have now.