Obama takes small steps in Moscow
By M K Bhadrakumar

The Cold War may or may not be lurking in the shade, but the mystique of Russian-American summitry lingers. In an event packed with animated passions in the run-up to it, and loaded with history, as the summit in Moscow on July 6-7 indeed was, what ultimately matters is the morning after.

Clearly, the Russian side has left it almost completely in the able hands of the White House to whip up hype in their media briefings to disseminate the impression that the summit was a resounding success. On their part, the Russians remained reticent - they almost lapsed into a native philosophical quietude.

It would have amused them immensely nonetheless to see Michael McFaul, President Barack Obama's point-person onRussia, to strain every nerve to assert that his boss did "reset" US-Russia ties. In February, McFaul left Stanford to take up his new assignment as Obama's special assistant for National Security Affairs and senior director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council.

The irony couldn't have been lost on the Russians that it was ultimately left to McFaul, who used to teach a popular undergraduate course in Stanford that explored the development of "color revolutions" and the nature of competitive authoritarianism, to dare the inquisitive American media persons accompanying Obama to Moscow to find a past US-Soviet summit where the two sides had dealt with so many matters of substance.

The icing on the cake was McFaul's stunning remark, "Just remember, if they [Russians] wanted to have an adversarial relationship with us on Iran right now, there are all kinds of things they could do very easily that would make our situation a lot worse there. And they're not doing those things."

Part of the reason for the mystique of the Moscow summit was the engrossing persona of Obama and the seductive charm of his gait and words. Obama has no previous "Russia connection" except for his love, like any intelligent African-American would conceivably have, for Alexander Pushkin, which likely inspired him to name his second daughter Natasha in honor of the poet's wife Natalya Goncharova (Natasha is usually the Russian diminutive of Natalya). Besides, Pushkin too had African roots traceable to his grandfather from Ethiopia. But in the unforgiving world of big-power politics, human bondage is hardly anything to go by.

The intriguing question, therefore, remained unanswered right till the eve of the US president's arrival in Moscow. As Izvestia noted: "Barack Obama remains a mysterious character ... Is he a true democrat and a man of his word, or just a glib talker? He has promised many things, in particular, to reset relations with Russia ... In US political culture, you can become president if you have a talent for talking. [Former president] Bill Clinton always used the same trick to manipulate [president] Boris Yeltsin: he nodded at everything the Russian president said and assured him of his friendship while never budging an inch from his stand. His team says Yeltsin did everything that Clinton wanted."

The Russian angst was palpable. Three things combined. One, Obama has assembled a foreign-policy team to handle Russia, which includes dramatis personae such as McFaul, who are well known for their "hard line" towards Russia. Noted Russia scholar Stephen Cohen of New York University recently said, "The major stumbling block is the 'old thinking' ... The notion that Russia is a defeated power, it's not a legitimate great power with equal rights to the US, that Russia should make concessions while the US doesn't have to, that the US can go back on its promises because Russia is imperialistic and evil ... There is enormous support in the US for the old thinking. It's the majority view."

Two, as Izvestia noted, Obama's words, cliches and good manners are just fine, but, "The US administration must do something to show that it has really changed its stand. So far, not a single drop has been poured from the 'carafe of promises' into the glass of 'resetting' relations."

Three, does the reset itself, therefore, signify a change of policy or is it a mere change of rhetoric? Russian-American relations have plunged to their lowest point in a quarter of a century. The good part is that there are signs of the Obama administration doing some rethinking about the US's role in the contemporary world. But the difficult part is that US-Russia relations cannot conceivably begin from a clean slate. Simply put, far too much happened - US-sponsored "color revolutions" in Tbilisi and Kiev, continued expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the territories of the former Soviet republics, unrelenting contest for influence in Eurasia, US plans to deploy a missile defense system in Central Europe, conflict in the Caucasus, and so on.

Such bitter political legacy apart, the mode of Russian foreign policy too has shifted to a "proactive type" in comparison with the "reactive type" of policy, as was the case when NATO dismembered Yugoslavia or the US occupied Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Equally, Russia, like the rest of the world, is conscious that the US's "unipolar moment" has ended and that Obama too probably realizes the futility of any attempt to preserve the colossal inertia of "unipolarity" in political or psychological terms. Thus, the summit in Moscow provided an extraordinary pageantry to outline or to give greater definition to the promised reset in US-Russian relations.

The consensus opinion in both the American and Russian camps was that the summit wouldn't produce any dramatic breakthrough. The old Russia hand, Strobe Talbott, who has been a witness, participant or protagonist in Russian-American co-existence through the past four decades, was prescient when he told Vremya Novostei, "This summit is unlikely to be a failure. Neither do I expect it to fail to provide a new impetus ... As for the reset button, I'm convinced that it should be pushed by both parties."

To be sure, there were no momentous results. But something seems to have changed on two tracks, which might provide an impetus to the relationship. The first steps have been taken towards a new strategic arms limitation treaty. They are small steps and they are not very confident ones, but the fact is they have been taken. The second track is the agreement on Afghanistan. This as such does not change the character of the US-Russia relationship nor should its impact on the trajectory of the Afghan war be exaggerated. But it is highly symbolic.

Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev have called for a reduction of their countries' nuclear arsenals from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads and from 1,600 to between 500 and 1,100 delivery vehicles. They have seven years to reach these figures. Medvedev called the agreement a "reasonable compromise" and hoped that a new treaty could be agreed by the year-end.

But he flagged that serious differences remained over plans to put elements of a missile shield in Central Europe. Clearly, impediments remain in the way of negotiating a new nuclear arms control agreement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that expires on December 5, though the two leaders played down differences.

Medvedev used markedly softer language, "No one is saying that missile defense is harmful in itself or ... poses a threat to someone", while Obama said optimistically, "I believe that over time we will end up seeing that the US and Russian positions on these issues can be reconciled and that in fact we have a mutual interest in protecting both our populations."

The agreement on Afghanistan, on the other hand, is a big geopolitical statement by Russia. Moscow has agreed to allow the US to ferry military hardware and personnel across its territory to Afghanistan. Up to 4,500 flights will be allowed annually and in a "transparent" arrangement; Moscow reserves the right to inspect the cargo of the American military aircraft. The White House says it could save up to US$133 million a year in transit costs, which is not much in the overall expenditure on the Afghan war, but then every dollar counts.

The main point is that the agreement is a sequel to Moscow's unreserved support for the US when the latter came under attack on September 11, 2001, and it signals Russia's readiness to move forward in an equal partnership. It underscores that there is no schadenfreude in Moscow over the US's difficulties in Afghanistan.
However, Moscow is providing access across Central Asia, which, in turn, makes it unnecessary and unjustifiable for the US to establish a military presence in that strategically important region. Russia also underlines the importance of the involvement of regional powers in the stabilization of the Afghan situation. Russia has signaled, to quote Medvedev, that "we are prepared to a have a full-scale cooperation with our US and other partners, including in transit areas. We are prepared to help in the various aspects."

Moscow sees cooperation on Afghanistan as a key element in any effort to reset the US-Russia relationship. However, the overall stalemate continues over several contentious issues. Obama is not looking to compromise on any of those points, and he is no different in this respect from his post-Cold War predecessors.

Arguably, a new element of tension appeared by a conscious strategy by the Obama administration to insert a wedge between Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and create a rift within the Kremlin. To quote noted Russia-watcher Peter Lavelle, "Either Obama believes he has already mastered Russian politics ... or he is being given some very bad advice ... In Russia today, it is simply impossible to play Medvedev off against Putin. Both represent the same policy approaches, including foreign policies, but in different ways."

In sum, the summit concluded with Washington and Moscow holding divergent opinions about the situation around Iran, the flashpoint issue of Georgia, NATO expansion, missile defense and Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space. The Russian Foreign Ministry abruptly drew attention to this down to-earth reality by issuing two sharply worded statements on Tuesday while Obama's visit was still on.

The first statement concerning Georgia firmly rejected the "hypocritical attempt" by the West to "shift the blame" to Russia for the termination of the mandate for the United Nations and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The second statement by the Foreign Ministry condemned as violative of norms of international law and the United Nations charter the weekend remarks by US Vice President Joseph Biden to the effect that Israel had the right to take a sovereign decision on a military strike against Iran.

Biden's remarks didn't actually warrant a Russian rebuttal. But Moscow probably decided to put Obama's hawkish deputy on the mat while the boss was in town to balance to some extent the mischievous briefings given by White House officials, touting a growing US-Russia convergence over Iran, which of course was exaggerated hype.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.