Monday, March 14, 2011

Obama's Libya Inaction Risks Missing an Opening

Obama's Libya Inaction Risks Missing an Opening: Lisa Anderson

The Obama administration’s hesitation is difficult to fathom as the Libyan government tries to crush a rebellion sparked by the popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt.

Unlike the rulers in Tunisia and Egypt, Muammar Qaddafi has long been a provocative and exasperating opponent of U.S. interests -- the U.S. didn’t even have an ambassador in Tripoli from 1979 until 2008. The recent revival of diplomatic relations was accompanied by modest intelligence cooperation as the Libyan and U.S. governments made common cause against al-Qaeda, but the U.S. has little to lose in far more assertive support for the Libyan rebellion. And President Barack Obama has much to gain in helping coordinate multilateral support for it.

Even if the battle turns in his favor, Qaddafi will never regain complete control of the country, nor will he win back the international community’s acquiescence in his rule. Yet we know that he won’t retire gracefully from the leadership of his revolution; he has said he will die in its defense and he means it. Nor are the rebels going to surrender only to be slaughtered by Qaddafi’s forces; they too may as well die in battle.

There is, therefore, little to be gained in waiting to see how the fighting turns out: a long, drawn-out and well-televised bloodbath as the two sides fight to the finish would be humiliating to the entire international community, not least the U.S. president, who has made himself one of world’s most eloquent advocates of freedom, democracy and human rights.

Daunting Task

The longer the fighting goes on, the more difficult will be the already daunting task of repairing the social, economic and political damage wrought by Qaddafi’s more than 40 years of uninterrupted rule. The political calculus of the Libyan people has already been deeply influenced by Qaddafi’s decades of manipulation and brutality. More than 75 percent of the population was born after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, and very few Libyans have even passing familiarity with the rule of law, personal liberty or civic responsibility.

Ruled for decades by arbitrary and cruel decree, Libyans often resorted to unsavory expedients to obtain simple necessities such as access to medical care, exit visas or even Internet services. As a result, their trust in the system and in each other eroded, and they took refuge in the last remaining source of assistance and solace: tribe and family. Libyan society has been fractured along tribal and clan lines, and every national institution, including the military, is divided by the cleavages of kinship and region. This means there are personal scores to settle and local rivalries to cope with.

No Organization

There is no system of political alliances, no network of economic associations; there is no national organization of any kind. Libya will again need the sort of international assistance it enjoyed on the eve of its independence in 1951. At that time, devastated by decades of fascist rule and the North African military campaigns of World War II, the former Italian colony was delivered to the United Nations.

The UN secured law and order and appointed a commissioner who worked with a provisional assembly of 60 Libyans -- 20 each from the western, eastern and southern provinces -- to draft a constitution and plan for elections. The new system wasn’t a complete success, not least because the majority of the representatives in the new parliament were illiterate, like most of their constituents, but it did serve to secure a peaceful transition to independence.

Outside Help

The appointment of a UN commissioner may not be the perfect mechanism 60 years later, but some outside assistance in imposing law and order, restoring the economy, and bringing the fractious, jealous and inexperienced leadership of a post- Qaddafi Libya together will probably be necessary. Libyans will need to design political institutions with which they can all live, and they will need help to do so, at least at the outset.

Neither the U.S. nor the international community should be deterred by the difficulty of imagining the aftermath from fulfilling their responsibility to protect civilians from the depredations of vicious governments -- in fact, they should plan for it. Any military and diplomatic intervention that will bring an end to the Qaddafi regime should be accompanied, from the beginning, by mobilization of the resources for political reconstruction. Today, such assistance needn’t be expensive, in either financial or political terms.

There are many international organizations whose expertise could be lent to the purposes of the post-Qaddafi transition. The Club of Madrid’s gathering of former national presidents from around the world who are willing to provide technical advice to transitional nations moving toward democracy is just one example. But they will need to be part of a dialogue now about a multilateral and multifaceted effort to oust the Qaddafi regime and plan for the future of the country.

A military intervention in the absence of plans for civilian reconstruction is a recipe for failure. But a comprehensive approach that included international civil society would be a harbinger of a more nimble global community and a more peaceful and just world in the 21st century.

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