Colombia: The FARC's Carrot-and-Stick Strategy

Summary

LUIS ROBAYO/AFP/Getty Images

A Colombian protester with a sign reading, "Release Them Right Now!" in Cali, Valle del Cauca department, Colombia

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) announced plans to release 10 hostages and cease the kidnapping of civilians for extortion. Simultaneously, the FARC remains engaged in its militant activities, devoting particular attention to energy extraction facilities. Claims that a major oil producer may halt operations due to security concerns highlights the ability of the FARC to pressure Colombia on key economic concerns while simultaneously offering peaceful concessions. The FARC hopes to exploit these needs to draw the government into negotiations, but the government will continue to be cautious about agreeing to peace talks.

 

Analysis

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) announced Feb. 26 in a statement published on the leftist website Anncol that it will release 10 hostages held for 14 years and henceforth cease to kidnap civilians for extortion. If followed through, the announcement represents a significant step toward meeting the Colombian government's demand that the group cease all kidnapping and all militant activity before peace talks are possible. In response, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos stated on his official Twitter feed that the FARC's offer was welcome, but insufficient.
The offer is a part of the FARC's larger negotiating strategy to push the Colombian government toward peace negotiations. Alongside this apparently unconditional offer, the FARC has continued attacking energy installations, which has led to claims that U.S. energy firm Occidental Petroleum Corp. may consider halting operations. The FARC militant campaign combined with other militant and criminal activity in Colombia continues to undermine the government's ability to guarantee the security of foreign companies and encourage foreign investment -- a key part of Colombia's economic development strategy. Despite the FARC's promise to cease hostage taking and the ongoing vulnerability of key economic assets, the government will continue to be cautious about agreeing to peace talks.

Attacks Persist

According to statements by Arauca department Gov. Facundo Castillo in early February, Occidental Petroleum Corp. is considering a suspension of its operations in Colombia. Castillo said the Cano-Limon-Covenas pipeline -- which Occidental uses in partnership with Colombian oil firm Ecopetrol to export oil from the Cano-Limon oil field -- was attacked 13 times in just the first two months of 2012 (presumably by the FARC, although these attacks and the identity of the perpetrators are unconfirmed). As a result, Occidental was forced to halt operations for 43 of the first 54 days of 2012, costing Arauca department some 10 billion Colombian pesos ($5.63 million) in fees.
Though not unprecedented, a decision by Occidental to shut down its operations would present a significant political problem for the Colombian government, which has put a heavy emphasis on encouraging foreign investment into its extractive industries. These efforts have boosted Colombian oil production by about 50 percent since the low recorded in 2007, reaching an annual production of 800,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) in 2010. For the FARC and leftist Colombian rebel group the National Liberation Army (ELN), attacking these investments is a way to both extort money and put political pressure on the Colombian government, which each group strongly opposes.
The FARC's ability to conduct large-scale attacks has deteriorated since the United States and Colombia launched the joint military anti-drug offensive Plan Colombia in 2000. But it is not unusual for the FARC and other militant elements in Colombia to attack oil infrastructure and personnel. The attacks support extortion schemes designed to get foreign investors to pay protection money to local militant actors. Such payments are illegal, a stance reinforced in March 2011 when Santos said that companies who pay protection money to militants will be expelled from the country. Santos' warning came after reported payments by Canadian oil company Talisman led to the release of 21 of 23 subcontractors kidnapped by the FARC. (The company denies making the payments). Instead, the Colombian government assures companies that the Colombian military will protect foreign assets. Given the dozens of kidnappings and violent attacks on foreign personnel each year, however, such protection is demonstrably ineffective.

Geographic Challenges

Colombia's geographic realities play a large part in the vulnerability of oil installations. Colombia has a range of areas promising for oil production. But unlike the concentrated Maracaibo and Orinoco oil deposits in neighboring Venezuela, Colombia's deposits are scattered around the country in relatively small pockets. Consequently, extraction projects are scattered throughout Colombia and isolated. Pipelines -- such as the 740-kilometer (460-mile) Cano-Limon-Covenas pipeline -- that stretch through hundreds of kilometers of ungoverned Colombian jungles are even more vulnerable as stationary targets for explosive attacks.
Despite gains made by the Colombian military against the FARC in the past decade, the country's physical vulnerabilities affect the security of investments in Colombia. Occidental is not alone in its concerns. Indeed, a range of companies operating in Colombia -- including Talisman, Colombian state-owned energy company Ecopetrol, Chinese energy company Emerald, Colombian contracting company Codisa (attacked while working for Occidental), seismic exploration company Geoenergy and Canadian energy company Alange -- have been the recent targets of violent attacks and kidnappings. In light of the government's inability to deliver on security guarantees, companies are often left to decide how best to handle personnel and facility security. Each has a number of options, from hiring private security resources, to paying off local militants, to hoping that working with the Colombian government will yield necessary levels of security.

The Politics of Violence

Beyond more typical criminal aims, attacks on oil infrastructure also put direct pressure on Bogota's political priorities. The government spends a significant amount of money each year convincing investors that Colombia is safe -- and to a degree, it is. Indeed, as a result of significant military and intelligence pressure placed on the FARC during Plan Colombia, the FARC's ability to conduct significant attacks has diminished. The group has largely been reduced from large-scale explosive attacks to hit-and-run tactics.
The successes of the Colombian government have given it the upper hand against the FARC, and Bogota has systematically rejected repeated calls from the rebel group for talks. Backed by consistent successes such as the arrests of top FARC military, political and financial leaders, there is no need for Bogota to capitulate. The government, however, still faces significant vulnerabilities. While foreign companies operating in Colombia pay security taxes to the government in explicit exchange for the promise of military protection, given Colombia's enduring physical challenges, this kind of security is difficult to provide without a broader political settlement to the conflict.

Looking Ahead

Despite the Feb. 26 announcement, kidnappings and violence will not stop in Colombia. The FARC's promise this week did not include halting kidnappings of Colombian security forces. Additionally, the release of all hostages held by the FARC will take quite a long time. The FARC holds more than 400 civilian hostages, according to Colombian non-governmental organization Pais Libre. Furthermore, the majority of kidnappings in Colombia are done by non-political, purely criminal organizations. In addition to the ELN, there are numerous other criminal and paramilitary organizations throughout Colombia that use violence primarily to extort money from the local population.
The Santos government will be very cautious about agreeing to peace talks with the FARC. In past cease-fires, the failure of lengthy peace talks gave the FARC and other militant organizations time to rest, recuperate and regain their footing against government forces. For the government, therefore, peace negotiations will only be possible when it can be assured first that a political accommodation can be reached, and when it knows the FARC is not just trying to buy time.