Iran’s Political Power Struggle

By: Warren Beatty

Iran has been much in the news lately, with its atomic bomb, er, energy program, its nuclear scientist short lifespan, its “Close the Strait of Hormuz” exercise, its telling the US that an aircraft carrier had better not come back into the Persian Gulf, and its test firing of a home built missile. So I thought a look at its internal politics may prove interesting.


The power struggle in Iran between the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, could lead to Ahmadinejad’s resignation. It was predictable that when Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi resigned (or was dismissed) from Ahmadinejad’s cabinet in April, 2011, it would be costly for Ahmadinejad. The extent of the damage for Ahmadinejad’s defiance of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is now becoming clear. According to the Tehran Etedaal newspaper, several people close to Ahmadinejad and his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, have been arrested by security services. Moslehi defied Ahmadinejad by being more loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Got that? It has always been difficult to be a player in Iranian politics/religion.
The attack on the British embassy in Tehran in November, 2011, by Iranian “youths” is another example of this situation. Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, condemned Great Britain and said that the action of Iranian “youth” was reflecting the view of all Iranians. This line had to have been transmitted through Khamenei’s office that already supported the embassy attack as “the people’s reaction” to Britain’s hostile economic action (sanctions).
Ahmadinejad attempted to undermine Larijani, a political competitor and possible presidential candidate in 2013. Ahmadinejad took a big political chance and went against the already established line by opposing the diplomatic sanctions already called for against Great Britain. A more cynical interpretation of the Iranian president’s tactic would suggest he recognizes that Ayatollah Khamenei does not support him or his political future, and in consequence Ahmadinejad decided to seek political support from the more moderate elements in Iranian politics. His turning to those who represent a less confrontational wing of Iran’s political life may be his only hope of continuing to remain a major player.
From a practical point of view the internal security service of VEVAK, the al Quds force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Council of Guardians are the operative instruments of Ayatollah Khamenei that hold the physical and ideological reins of power. If an individual or group seeks to wrest power from the existing structure militarily, judicially, or politically, they seemingly have an insurmountable obstacle to overcome. If a politician (in this case Ahmadinejad) takes a line contrary to that which is generally approved by the supreme leader’s office, but can point to a form of consent from one of the power centers (in this case, the Council of Guardians), he has covered himself.
The ultimate question then becomes whether or not Ayatollah Ali Khamenei can remain as the supreme leader, and the answer is in the hands of the religious hierarchy, not the electoral process. And the answer to this question has some very real implications for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Just what the rest of the world needs – a political power struggle in Iran while it develops nuclear weapons and buys delivery systems from North Korea.