The drug war in Mexico grows
more brutal daily. It is practically impossible to read news from that
country without exposure to a myriad of literal rolling heads, mass
graves, shootouts, and grisly abductions. While addressing the Council
on Foreign Relations on September 8, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton qualified the situation in Mexico as “looking more and
more like Colombia looked 20 years ago, when the narco-traffickers
controlled certain parts of the country.”[i]
In fact, both U.S. and Mexican policymakers have proposed tactics based
on the Colombian experience. However, one must closely examine the
practical differences between the two countries before applying
Colombian tactics to Mexico indiscriminately, since in practice many of
Colombia’s crime strategies might well be ineffective in the Mexican
case.
Source: Borderland Beat
Inequality, Drugs, and Violence: Colombia 2.0?
On the surface, similarities between the
two countries are obvious: both are tainted by the almost uncontrolled
presence of organized crime and a quickened tempo of violence. As in
Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, urban violence has risen, and criminal
groups have proliferated. The news regularly portrays drugs cartels
slamming into each other and the state, usually through indiscriminate
homicides and massacres that target innocent civilians. Such was the
case in Monterrey in August 2011, when gunmen burst into the Casino
Royale, burning down the building and killing over fifty people.[ii]
In fact, Ciudad Juárez, the most dangerous city in the world, has
surpassed Medellín’s homicide rate, reaching 10 to 11 deaths per day.[iii]
Moreover, both Colombia and Mexico
suffer from some of the world’s most unequal distributions of wealth. In
1995, Colombia was ranked the fifth most unequal country (of those with
available statistics), with a Gini[1]
coefficient of 0.57, while Mexico was ranked the eighth worst with a
Gini coefficient of 0.52. Between 2006 and 2010, Colombia’s inequality
ranked 0.58, while Mexico’s coefficient was 0.52, qualifying them as two
of the lowest ranked countries in the world.[iv]
This income inequality, partnered with the lack of available jobs,
especially living-wage positions, has increased crime as an alternative
for earning an income. The profits of drug trafficking are not only high
but can also kick in immediately, and many job-seekers are willing to
risk the accompanying dangers to obtain a share. It is no wonder that
economic inequality has been one of the factors creating fertile ground
for the development of criminal organizations.
Furthermore, modern Mexico, like
Colombia two decades before, suffers from “chronic impunity,” whereby
“corruption, violence and human rights abuse[s] have rarely been
punished by the powerful few.”[v]
The corruption and poor law enforcement present in both countries have
facilitated the growth of organized crime, as well as its proliferation
within political institutions. While this “chronic impunity” reveals
weakened political systems, it fails to highlight key differences
between basic Mexican and Colombian institutions that are crucial for
the implementation of anti-corruption and anti-crime policies.
Weak Democracy vs. Corporatist One-Party Rule
Although weakened governmental
institutions invite the rise of crime, the weaknesses of the two
countries largely occur along different planes. Many would consider that
Colombia has had a long history of democracy in comparison to its Latin
American counterparts. Colombia has regularly held elections and
features a centralized, multi-party system that includes three major,
well-represented parties. Centralization and established democratic
institutions make it demonstrably easier to reform and reorganize ailing
institutions, especially in the areas of the judiciary and law
enforcement.
The problems of the Colombian state
arose from a flawed governmental presence in rural and low-income urban
areas as well as from decades-long unattended land grab and propriety
issues. This power vacuum facilitated the rise of non-state actors, such
as paramilitaries and guerrilla forces, at the peak of the Medellín
cartel’s power. In the 1990s, drug traffickers controlled many
neighborhoods in that city, while guerrilla forces controlled up to
one-third of the country. Generally, the main problem facing the
Colombian state has been the presence of guerrillas rather than
organized crime. The presence of guerrillas intermittently shifted the
attention of the military and government from the drug cartels to
“counter-insurgency.” Despite the fact that guerrillas systematically
tax cocaine crops and drug traffickers operating in their area, these
groups otherwise rarely cooperate. Increased tension over possession of
territories has created a de facto coalition between narco-traffickers,
paramilitaries, and the army against the guerrillas.[vi]
The paramilitaries in particular have acted as state agents in their
fight against the guerrilla forces. It is no surprise, then, that Bogota
has managed to settle a deal with the cartels, but yet has failed to
make peace negotiations with the FARC and ELN insurgent armies a matter
of the highest priority.
Mexican democracy, on the other hand, is
relatively new and highly vulnerable. The government has had to deal
with the unyielding complexities involved in the nature of the Mexican
state that would make the restructuring of that country’s institutions
much more difficult. Former administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Agency, Robert Bonner, describes Mexico’s federal system of law
enforcement as having “two federal, 32 state, and over 1,500 municipal
police agencies.”[vii]
Reformation and reorganization of Mexican multi-crime institutions
would thus require a prodigious amount of coordination among fragmented
and complex states, municipalities, and the federal layer of government.
Furthermore, Mexico is still emerging from 71 years of single-party rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional -
PRI), whose predominating role terminated in 2000. Years of
single-party rule created a vertical system of co-optation that expanded
across the entire national territory. In other words, the PRI used a
‘clientelistic’ approach, granting favors from the bottom up in order to
achieve its goals, as opposed to giving power to particular
institutions that would help create autonomy. Although a civilian state
and multiple police forces were present in these areas, the PRI’s
corporative[2]
system lent itself to easy corruption and penetration by organized
crime. The presence of such a crime rink is notable in urban areas,
especially along the border with the United States, where there are many
government officials and thousands of well-armed and strategically
placed drug traffickers. According to Fernando Escalante, sociologist at
the Colegio de México, once the PRI system slowly dissolved, no particular mechanism was left to co-opt and control the informal sector.[viii]
Also, although there is a small presence
of paramilitaries and guerrillas in Mexico, they are nowhere near as
visible a factor as in Colombia. Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations
are largely centered around urban zones, while the guerrillas are still
concentrated in rural areas. Therefore, it is unlikely that they
interact as was the case in Colombia. It is also unlikely that
guerrillas will make a significant profit out of drug trafficking, since
it is not their primary focus. Paramilitary forces in Mexico, such as
the Mata Zetas, have appeared not in response to the guerrillas, but
rather to drug trafficking organizations. However, these paramilitary
groups do not appear to be as well established as the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
– AUC). Thus, Colombia differs from Mexico in that its criminal
operators created a war zone in which guerillas and paramilitaries were
the largest contributors of violence. In contrast, drug trafficking
organizations and criminal gangs were the main contributors of violence
in Mexico. The murders in Mexico have served to transmit messages to
rival groups and security forces as well as to influence public opinion,
but never seem to have had a clear political goal.[ix] In the end, this only exacerbated a climate of insecurity and violence.
Post-Escobar Organized Crime: Less Glamour, More Strategy
Paradoxically, another difficulty that
Mexico faces is the fact that the periods of massive drug cartel
omnipotence have already passed. Modern-day cartels have learned much
from the days of Escobar, and have reorganized themselves very
differently since then. By creating a high profile, drug traffickers are
more likely to become targets of the state, and are thus more likely to
be caught. Pablo Escobar, possibly the most notorious drug lord in
history, had an unparalleled thirst for notoriety. His unrelenting
ambition caused him to stand for Congress and personally kill selected
politicians in public, including presidential candidates, judges, and
ministers. Pablo Escobar controlled the Medellín cartel organization and
directly benefited from such mayhem and pillaging.
Mexican capos have learned
their vocabulary from Escobar’s over-exposure in an attempt to escape a
similarly grim fate. In fact, journalist and author of “The Last Narco,”
Malcolm Beith, argues that “the cartel leaders in Mexico have
historically kept their ambitions in check. Prior to 2006, they rarely,
if ever, provoked the state.”[x]
Even when the bloodthirsty Arellano Felix brothers went on their
killing sprees, they rarely challenged the authorities directly. Many
have observed that Mexican capos are more elusive and more difficult for authorities to catch.
The capos’ low profiles have
given them the space to create extremely powerful drug trafficking
organizations by focusing on business acumen. As Beith describes it,
these organizations now rely “on corruption and good business sense
(delegation over micromanagement, franchising of operations and,
effectively, the encouragement of free enterprise under the umbrella of
their organization) rather than pure greed and megalomania,”
characteristic of the Escobar era.[xi]
For instance, it took years for the authorities to realize that Joaquín
“El Chapo” Guzmán Loera was running the Sinaloa cartel behind the
scenes, and he has not been caught to this day after escaping from
prison in 2000. In fact, El Chapo has been hiding so effectively that
many speculate that he is under the protection of the federal
government.[xii]
However, the nature of the Mexican
cartels is in no way homogenous. Though some, such as the Sinaloa
cartel, have become vertical transnational organizations, other cartels
have very distinct profiles. The two most notable cartels, best known
for straying from this particular structure, are La Familia Michoacana
and Los Zetas. La Familia, which started as an anti-crime vigilante
group, quickly took over the methamphetamine business in Michoacán. Many
would argue that it is closely intertwined with locals and government
officials, and it could be argued that it is a more effective authority
than any branch of the government in Michoacán. La Familia not only
brings “justice” to the citizens of Michoacán, but also serves as a
moral authority through its pseudo-Catholic cult status and punitive
morality. The Zetas, on the other hand, are comprised of former elite
cadets who forsworn their oath and became renegade members of the drug
cartels. These soldiers at first served as the paramilitary death squad
wing of the Gulf Cartel, and then split off to form their own criminal
organizations. The Zetas are known for being especially bloodthirsty and
brutal since they regularly target innocent civilians. In fact, the
mass killing of 72 migrants in Tamaulipas in 2010 was attributed to
them. Appreciating the different characteristics of individual cartels
is a key to understanding how each cartel must be dismantled.
Mexico’s drug cartel situation is
considerably different than was the case of Colombia’s in the 1980s and
1990s for the following reasons. First, its drug cartels are
increasingly more sophisticated and less homogenous. Second, Mexican
cartels are relatively more powerful and more numerous than the
Colombian cartels, and third, the cartels are more or less equal to each
other in their power and punch.
Mexican authorities are not dealing with
centralized drug trafficking organizations such as is the case with the
Medellín cartel, but rather with different, complex, and highly
structured organizations that do not necessarily depend on the decadence
of only one leader. Although the Cali cartel, another main actor in
Colombia, followed a different path than its Medellín counterpart—
functioning by bribing all the way up to the presidency via different
cells that were focused on different areas[xiii]—
Cali was taken down after Medellín had been similarly dismantled by the
officials. The “kingpin strategy” of hunting down top officials may not
be as applicable as it was in Colombia. Mexican cartels tend to be
larger and more complex than Colombia’s, but have a roster of equally
violent members who do not depend on the kingpin to provide leadership.
Instead, the death of the kingpin predictably triggers the violent
fracturing of large cartels into still powerful micro-ones, which can
lead to wars of succession.
The relative power and the sheer number
of Mexican cartels have resulted in a more dangerous and complex
situation than existed in Colombia. During the 1980s and 1990s,
Colombia’s Medellín and Cali cartels thrived, but also always competed
with one another for power. For example, Colombian officials effectively
went after the Medellín cartel by making deals with the Cali cartel,
which they later dismantled. Breaking up the cartels created a
micro-cartel phenomenon in Colombia, resulting in small, less dangerous
criminal organizations.
Breaking up cartels provokes a “hydra
effect,”which means that for each cartel that the government dismantles,
at least two more appear to replace it. At the beginning of the
millennium there were only four main players, whereas today twelve major
groups and a host of smaller gangs control the drug trade.[xiv]
These increasingly divided cartels are still very powerful, and have
created more confusion and violence than had been anticipated. The
current situation in Mexico at times resembles a criminal free-for-all,
and it is often difficult to attribute specific crimes to specific
groups. Defeating drug cartels before they can re-form is challenging
when the identity of the enemy is unclear at any given time. This means
that Mexican drug trafficking groups should be carefully identified
first so that they can be properly eliminated. If not, there may be more
players, resulting in an all-out war with multiple cartels in coalition
with each other. However, going after each cartel one by one might also
be more difficult in Mexico since it is not feasible to co-opt ten
cartels in the process of dismantling one. Dismantling the cartels
should not take the form of a war, so much as an intelligence operation
specific to each organization, in which certain cartels are targeted
while others become subject to co-optation.
Finally, it is important to note that
drug cartels in Mexico do not only profit from trafficking drugs. These
criminal organizations also benefit from many other associated
activities such as piracy, kidnapping, extortion, and arms and human
trafficking as part of their profit base. Although it is arguable that
drug trafficking constitutes the main source of their income, these
groups have a firm organizational base regardless. Many of these
industries are strengthened by the fact that Mexico shares a border with
the U.S.
Mexico: So far from God and so close to the United States
The final significant difference between
how the drug trade operates in Mexico and Colombia is geographic;
Mexico borders the U.S. This geographic feature has two definitive
consequences that have not been part of any built-in problem with
Colombia. First, not only do drug cartels operate in Mexico, but that
country also forms the main migration route into the U.S. from Latin
America. Second, Mexico is subject to intensive arms trafficking from
the U.S., which fuels the existing drug trade and helps intensify the
conflict.
The fact that Mexico is a popular route
for drug smuggling into the U.S. makes territorial control an even more
important consideration for the cartels than it was in Colombia. In the
latter country, the value of territory derived from splitting the major
urban areas between the cartels (Cali and Medellín), as well as the
rural areas where coca crops were actually cultivated. Both the Cali and
Medellín cartels effectively divided territorial jurisdiction within
the U.S.; Cali operated mostly in New York while Medellín operated in
Miami. They also made use of distinct smuggling routes throughout
Central America and the Caribbean, although the cartels did not directly
operate them. Once the cartels collapsed, the “micro-cartels” easily
adapted and found new pathways.
In Mexico, however, the cartels have
direct control of the routing, making the possession of various conduits
into the U.S. extremely crucial to the profit margin of the local drug
trade. The “middlemen” traffickers are now actual members of the cartel.
This is especially notable once cartels divide; the new, rival Mexican
cartels are not only fighting for leadership and power, but also for
territory and gateways. The importance of turf has made intra and
inter-cartel violence bloody, especially near the border with the U.S.
There is no room for negotiations over territories when the control of
smuggling routes has a direct impact on profits.
Finally, the ease with which assault
weapons can be purchased and smuggled into Mexico only heightens the
violence. Such weapons are readily available for purchase from legal
U.S. gun shops along the border, with many ending up in the hands of
large-scale criminal and smuggler gangs. The majority of these weapons
are semi-automatic rifles, such as AK-47s. These arms can pierce through
the armor worn by police officers, complicating attempts by Mexican
officials to combat organized crime. The U.S.’ powerful gun lobby and
liberal gun laws only fuel the conflict. Without effective cooperation
from the U.S. government to prevent arms smuggling, the brutality of
drug cartels is bound to remain at frighteningly high levels.
Colombia: Success or Cautionary Tale?
What many policymakers fail to realize
is that the Colombian case was not successful. The suffocation of the
Colombian cartels and the closing of drug smuggling routes through the
Caribbean only strengthened the role of the Mexican cartels, as that
country became the only viable option for transporting cocaine. Once
Colombian cartels were weakened, Mexican traffickers formed their own
cartels instead of retaining their role as traffickers for the
Colombians. These cartels are now not only exceedingly diverse and
numerous, but are also in the backyard of the U.S., which further
complicates the immigration issue. If anything, the failed results of
the Colombian strategy only prove its shortsightedness.
The current, much heated-up conflict in
Mexico is simply a different beast than the previous one in Colombia.
Firstly, Mexico has a much more complex federal structure than does
Colombia and a history of corporatist institutional corruption, which
makes reorganization of its institutions very difficult. Secondly, drug
cartels are now more sophisticated, varied, and numerous than was the
case in Colombia. Finally, Mexico’s proximity to the U.S. makes
inter-cartel territorial battles much more brutal, since the seizure of
key routes into the country is a main and immediate goal, and arms
trafficking is far from being controlled by its across-the-border
neighbor. These issues become key features when formulating an
appropriate anti-crime strategy in Mexico.
The picture painted of Mexico here is
appropriately grim, and calls for immediate attention to the root of the
issue. If the U.S. wants to prevent large criminal organizations from
threatening the sovereignty of these two neighboring nations, then it
needs to attack the root causes of the status quo instead of launching
episodic skirmishes against diaphanous symptoms. Even if the problem in
Mexico is “solved,” it will be hard to predict what may happen next.
After all, “success” in Colombia concentrated the power of organized
crime in Mexico. What remains enticing about these criminal
organizations is the chance to earn high profits in places where jobs,
especially living wage-paying jobs, are scarce. Ironically, the
profitability of the drug trade is mostly due to ongoing drug
prohibition in the U.S. The punitive nature of U.S. drug policy raises
the stakes and cost of drug trafficking. This leads to an exponential
multiplier effect in the drug trade, which makes the industry highly
profitable. The U.S. must reexamine prevailing drug policies within its
borders and at least begin to explore the decriminalization of drugs in
order to save its neighbor from the violence caused by organized crime.
Policy change is more important than the mere provision of military
assistance or territorial interdiction.
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