Why reform of House of Lords is a botch

By Martin Wolf

To what question is the right answer “let’s have more elected politicians”? Apparently, it is: how should the UK reform the House of Lords? But this is a foolish answer. A huge amount of effort is about to be devoted to an ill-conceived reform.
Start by asking the purpose of a second chamber of parliament. I can identify three possible answers: to house different interests from those represented in the first chamber; to introduce a different kind of expertise; or to make legislation both harder to pass and more considered than it would otherwise be.
Any second chamber worth its salt must achieve the last of these aims. It must mitigate the “electoral dictatorship”. On this, it seems, one finds no disagreement. Yet a choice remains between the other two aims. Historically, the House of Lords represented different interests from those of the House of Commons: those of the territorial magnates. That had become absurd by the late 19th century, let alone the late 20th.


It is possible to conceive of two more modern ways to achieve a representation of interests. One would be representation of selected economic interests. But that would make the illiberal principle of corporatism a pillar of the constitution. That idea should be rejected. Another possibility would be for the second chamber to represent the components of a federation, as the senate does in the US. My colleague, Philip Stephens, has proposed this, in a column on 20 February. It makes perfect sense. The problem is that England is a small country with a long history of centralised government. Genuinely independent regions, similar to the provinces of Canada or even Germany’s länder would be artificial creations, lacking in any genuine legitimacy. They could be justified only as a convoluted way of “solving” the problem of Scotland.
Given this, the logical role of the second chamber is to contain different expertise from that in the first chamber. The right step then would be to strengthen the independence and expertise of the members, who would continue to be selected, as at present, rather than elected. The argument is that one can obtain a far more knowledgeable and experienced membership than under any system of elections.
A simple proposal on these lines was advanced by Nicholas Beale of Sciteb in a letter to the FT on June 22 2011. His idea was that half of the members should be independent and half selected by political parties. Selected individuals would then be in place for a non-renewable term of 15 years, as also proposed by the coalition government. Existing crossbench members would select replacements from a list of scrutinised nominees. The parties would select their own candidates.
The option advanced by the coalition, is very different. It suggests a hybrid, with 80 per cent of members elected and 20 per cent appointed. The elections would be “on the basis of proportional representation”. The argument for a predominantly elected second chamber advanced in the government's white paper on reform of the House of Lords is that: “in a modern democracy it is important that those who make the laws of the land should be elected by those to whom the laws apply. The House of Lords performs its work well but lacks sufficient democratic authority.” Nevertheless, despite possessing greater democratic legitimacy, “The reformed House of Lords would have the same functions as the current House.”
This proposal is a muddle. The mixture of appointed and elected representatives means that the source of its legitimacy – competence or election – would be confused. Furthermore, it would be a less competent revising chamber, since it would consist overwhelmingly of political placemen and placewomen, rather than those of exceptional eminence. Finally, its legitimacy would rival that of the House of Commons, making its right merely to slow legislation anomalous. Over time, the reformed house would surely claim an equal status to that of the House of Commons.
If the government were to enact the current proposal, the country would end up with an elected second chamber rivalling the House of Commons in legitimacy, yet containing members less qualified to provide authoritative scrutiny than the present House of Lords. This then is a reform that would deliver the worst of both worlds: greater difficulty in passing legislation without any improvement in its quality. What is the sense of that?
No reform of the second chamber can make sense unless it is grounded in a clear view of what it is for. If it is to be a credible revising chamber, keep it appointed, but let it contain members of the highest calibre. If the aim is to have an elected chamber, accept that it will be equal in legitimacy to the House of Commons and explain how that is to improve the quality of government. But a chamber with the current limited powers, with a predominantly or even entirely elected membership, makes no sense. It is neither fish nor fowl. It is likely to make the process of legislating more difficult and its quality even worse.