Fight Terrorism: Legalize Heroin

If you can’t beat ’em, undersell ’em.

Government officials find it difficult to admit when they’re wrong. Perhaps, like people in general, they see such an admission as a sign of weakness, and prefer to rationalize their failure rather than change their approach. This inevitably leads to calls for a “strengthening” of current policy and an expansion of the program in question.

The war on drugs is a perfect example. The U.S. government has been fighting intensely to rid the country of “dangerous drugs” for about 40 years now — much longer, some would argue — and year after year the war’s failures mount.

We citizens are regularly assured that the “tide is turning,” usually after some recent antidrug operation has yielded the “largest ever” bust in history, and thus we must “stay the course” in our antidrug efforts. Somehow the drug warriors never seem to realize that “largest ever” is an admission of failure. How can we possibly be winning this war if larger and larger shipments of drugs are being smuggled across our borders?

Americans are using drugs today just as they were last year, and the year before that, and the year before that, fueling the demand that keeps dealers in business — despite the desperate attempts of the United States and other governments to stifle drug production and exportation around the world. On Aug. 24, 2006, Agence France-Presse reported that the British government, which is now in charge of antidrug operations in Afghanistan, “is aiming for a 70 percent reduction in the next five years and elimination within 10 years” of Afghanistan’s opium trade. Governments just love those Five-Year Plans.

Why this sense of urgency? According to an Associated Press report in the Sept. 3 New Hampshire Union-Leader, “Afghanistan’s world-leading opium cultivation rose a ‘staggering’ 60 percent this year, the UN anti-drugs chief announced.” Sixty percent!

For years, Republicans have been talking up the need to reduce opium production in Afghanistan. House Speaker Dennis Hastert said in 2001 that “the illegal drug trade is the financial engine that fuels many terrorist organizations around the world, including Osama Bin Laden,” and in October 2003, the Washington Times reported that “the Bush administration has talked publicly of ridding Afghanistan of its lucrative poppy crop that provides 70 percent of the world’s heroin.” “Ridding” is an unequivocal term — like “largest ever.”

Today NATO troops occupy Afghanistan — a strategic scenario that U.S. drug warriors can only salivate at replicating stateside.

Obviously things haven’t turned out quite the way those in charge planned. A June 7 article on the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website reported that Afghanistan’s southern Helmand Province is expected to yield a “bumper crop” of opium this year. Ditto other parts of the country, pushing what was already the world’s largest opium producer even higher up the ladder, to about 76% of world opium production. AFP claims that “Between 70 and 90 percent of heroin used in Europe originates in Afghanistan.”

International efforts to control opium production in Afghanistan aren’t failing from a lack of resolve. In early 2001 the United States government allocated $43 million in humanitarian aid to help wean opium growers off their cash crop. After Sept. 11, 2001, the American and European governments seized an estimated $24 million in assets linked to al Qaeda, which is widely believed to fund its activities through opium and heroin sales.

Today NATO troops occupy the country — a strategic scenario that U.S. drug warriors can only salivate at replicating stateside — and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has a firm antiopium policy, creating a Counternarcotics Ministry in his government and outdoing the rest of the world by declaring not just a war but a “holy war” on narcotics. Congress earmarked $774 million for antinarcotics activities in Afghanistan in 2005, and allocated another $510 million for 2006–2007.

Alongside U.S. and NATO efforts are those of the British, with the Labour government’s antidrug minister, Bill Rammel, promising a “dismantling” of the “opium economy.” In his shadow lies waiting the Conservative opposition minister, who, employing the “me too” line of attack typical of opportunistic politicians, has criticized Labour’s efforts as insufficient “with the level of forces [in Afghanistan] that we’ve got.”

The full force of many governments is unmistakably behind this endeavor, with even more resources promised. Despite this, the AP reported (Sept. 3) that opium production is actually “outstripping the demand of the world’s heroin users by a third.” The U.S. State Department fears that Afghanistan is becoming a “narcotics state.”

All of which could lead a discerning individual to a threefold conclusion: opium growing on net is unaffected by eradication efforts, heroin demand around the world is on the rise (the UN Office of Drugs and Crime reports an increase in addiction in Central Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe), and producers are not the least bit afraid of the international antidrug movement.

World leaders are right to see legalization as an admission of failure, but admitting one is wrong and learning from a mistake is a signal of strength, not weakness.

None of this bodes well for the future of Afghanistan, or the war on drugs. The U.S. government launched military operations against the Taliban immediately after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, installing a government friendly to the United States and hostile to terrorist groups like al Qaeda that are believed to traffic in narcotics to fund their attacks. Sadly, the U.S. government didn’t take into account certain conditions that would undermine its objectives. For example, the opium trade makes up between 35% and 50% of the economy in Afghanistan, “where gross income [from heroin sales] was around 1.2 billion dollars last year” (AFP). Asking an Afghan peasant to give up poppy growing would be like asking a dairy farmer to surrender his cows.

Add to this the fact that Taliban and al Qaeda forces still operating in the hinterlands of the Wild Wild East are in a position, irrespective of the western military presence, to demand and reward loyalty from local farmers. It’s no surprise, then, that there’s a ready supply of opium growers with no love for those who would take away their livelihood, preferring instead those who spend their profits killing westerners. Not exactly a promising set of circumstances.

Most important, however, is the economics of drug dealing itself. Legislators and military strategists may decree what they like, but the laws of supply and demand cannot be ignored for long: Afghan farmers grow opium because increasing numbers of Americans, Canadians, Europeans, and Asians want to use heroin. This demand drives supply, providing every incentive for those who grow opium to continue doing so. Any short-term “success” in limiting supply — such as the UN’s claim that its policies have reduced the amount of land under opium cultivation by 21% — will only backfire in the long term: all things remaining equal, any reduction in supply merely drives up prices, boosting profits and creating incentives to expand the trade. Hence a 60% increase in opium cultivation despite years of effort to reverse the trend — and more money for the terrorists.

With stubbornness characteristic of government officials, Antonio Maria Costa, the UN’s version of a drug czar, wants to “crack down” on Afghan opium farming. What exactly does he think has been going on for the last five years?

One Five-Year Plan begets another, ensuring another half-decade of failed policies and another billion-plus dollars down the drain. And the same flawed logic that views “largest ever” seizures of drugs as a signal of drug war success is apparently prompting U.S., UN, and NATO leaders to see a spike in opium production, heroin sales, and heroin addiction as a sign to “stay the course” in the fight for eradication — no doubt with expanded wherewithal and renewed determination. This is all sounding very familiar.

A wiser course would be to take the profits from heroin sales out of the pockets of terrorists through legalization. Though long the dream of “kooky” libertarians, this idea might be edging its way into the mainstream. Emmanuel Reinert, executive director of the Senlis Council, an international policy thinktank with offices in Kabul, London, Paris, and Brussels, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (June 7) that:

[Legalization] would be a way for the central government [of Afghanistan] to collaborate with local communities, and not to alienate them or antagonize them, as is currently the case with the eradication policy.

Further, he said that such a move would “develop sustainable economic activities for Afghanistan, but on top of that you will bring the rule of law and good governance in the provinces.”

Anyone familiar with the war on drugs in the United States can see the wisdom in Reinert’s words. Making something in high demand illegal merely drives the production and sale of that particular item into the hands of black-marketeers, thus undermining the rule of law. Quite the contrary of “good governance,” prohibition puts the government in the position of harassing, intimidating, and ultimately bringing the full force of the law to bear against people who are merely satisfying the demand of willing buyers.

Legislators and military strategists may decree what they like, but the laws of supply and demand cannot be ignored for long.

In Afghanistan this alienates and antagonizes those communities that make their living from growing poppies and, by encouraging people to thwart the law, makes a mockery of the law and turns government into a bully that destroys their livelihood. Antiopium laws only drive a wedge between Afghan citizens and their government that can easily be exploited by people with murderous designs.

Legalization would surely end all that, and turn an outlawed practice into a “sustainable economic activity” with considerable benefits. The 21st Amendment repealed the prohibition on alcohol in the United States, and took alcohol production, sales, and distribution (and profits from same) out of the hands of organized crime bosses and put it in the hands of free-market businessmen. It also led to improved quality and a lower risk of alcohol poisoning.

If opium production were legalized, pharmaceutical companies rather than al Qaeda terrorists would be running the opium show in the Helmand Province, creating booming local economies and raising the living standards of Afghan peasants. Then Bayer or Dowpharma or Sandoz rather than Osama bin Laden would be profiting from the $11 billion Americans spend on heroin each year. Note that none of those companies currently sells heroin, and terrorists don’t manufacture headache tablets, despite the enormous profit potential in both businesses.

With the government working alongside international pharmaceutical giants, the agricultural economy would be protected, and very likely expand, offering more jobs to locals. Instead of arresting local officials, spraying poppy fields with dangerous chemicals, and sending Special Forces operatives to kick down doors, a collaborative, mutually beneficial relationship could be developed between poor peasants and the new government in Kabul that would undermine al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents.

The worst thing that could happen to narcoterrorists is legalization of their trade. Unfortunately, there’s no reason to expect a much-needed radical shift in policy. The United Nations blames heavy rainfall for the spike in opium production; Karzai blames a lack of support from western governments; Britain’s opposition Conservative Party blames low troop levels; and the U.S. government blames Karzai.

Legalization is the last thing on their minds. Just as there is big money for terrorists in the drug trade, there is big money, power, and prestige for government officials in continuing to fight this unwinnable war on drugs. While they rationalize failures, point fingers, call for more funding, and declare yet another “crackdown,” the poppies are in full bloom and terrorists are using the profits to plan murders.

A common definition of insanity is repeating the same mistake over and over again, all the while expecting different results. The international war on drugs is a perfect example. World leaders are right to see legalization as an admission of failure, but admitting one is wrong and learning from a mistake is a signal of strength and good sense, not weakness.

Drug war opponents have long noted that prohibition undermines the rule of law, encourages the corruption of government officials, tears at the social fabric, strains relations between police and citizenry, destroys communities, and emboldens the criminal element. These costs are already high enough. Add to them the additional consequence of enriching terrorists, and we have the crowning reason to legalize opium manufacturing in Afghanistan and heroin around the world.