Colombian standoff

Why rebels seem no closer to releasing their hostages

President Alvaro Uribe, now well into his second term in office, has failed to date to negotiate the release of hostages long held by Colombia’s largest rebel group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The latest attempt to agree a hostage-prisoner swap via mediation by Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, ended badly in November, when Mr Uribe abruptly halted the Venezuelan’s role in the process. This triggered a diplomatic rift with Caracas and some criticism of Mr Uribe’s handling of the situation. As the end of Mr Uribe’s term progressively nears, the prospects for a solution to the hostage crisis and, more broadly, peace talks with the FARC will grow dimmer.

Mr Uribe had invited Mr Chávez to engage in negotiations with the FARC in August. This was a surprise move, given the ideological differences between the two presidents, the potential for spillover of the conflict into Venezuelan territory (with some FARC guerrilla fronts and, consequently, the Colombian army operating close to the border) and the risks to bilateral relations. But Mr Uribe gave it a try nonetheless, in a sign that the government was short of other new approaches to convince the guerrillas to release their captives.

The FARC has been holding 45 political hostages for more than five years, including three US citizens and a former presidential candidate, Ingrid Betancourt. The group wants to exchange them for around 500 imprisoned guerrillas. There appeared to be willingness on their part to deal with Mr Chávez, seen perhaps as an ideological soul-mate. Mr Uribe’s decision to end the process was apparently triggered by Mr Chávez’s breaking an agreement and speaking directly with Gen Mario Montoya, the head of the Colombian armed forces.

Yet it seems that Mr Uribe was looking for a reason to halt Mr Chávez’s mediation. The political risks for Mr Uribe were beginning to mount as he was starting to lose control over the process. Further, he was unprepared to allow the guerrillas to use the talks to rebuild the political status they enjoyed during the failed peace talks held during the administration of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002).

After the end of Mr Chávez’s involvement, there was a bitter exchange of words between the two presidents. On November 28th Venezuela recalled its ambassador and Mr Chávez stated he would have no relations with the Colombian government while Mr Uribe was in power. The diplomatic row has not yet affected Colombia’s important trade and investment links with Venezuela, but Mr Chávez is a highly unpredictable politician and a disruption in commercial relations can not be ruled out.

France steps in

Under pressure, Mr Uribe has sought to retake the initiative, aware of the damage that this episode could cause to his political standing. After little progress on the exchange in the past five years, the hopes of the relatives of the 45 political hostages had been raised by Mr Chávez’s involvement. The president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, now has taken a personal interest in securing the release of Ms Betancourt, a Colombian-French citizen (she was kidnapped in 2002).

Mr Uribe has mounted a diplomatic offensive, not only restating that the FARC is a terrorist organisation that should be deprived of international political recognition, but also highlighting what the government has been doing to advance the process. He has also appealed to other countries in the region and overseas (mainly France) to assist with the prisoner-hostage swap. And he has instructed his peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, to seek direct talks with the FARC.

The process gained a sense of urgency when video and photographic materials were found with three FARC agents captured in Bogotá and aired on Colombian television at the end of November. Taken in mid-October, these materials provided evidence for the first time since 2003 that 16 of the captured hostages were alive. The photo of Ms Betancourt, who looked gaunt, spurred Mr Sarkozy to make a televised appeal to Manuel Marulanda, the leader of the FARC, to release her. He has also offered to play a role in brokering the release of the hostages.

Big gulf to bridge

Despite all this, prospects for an exchange still appear poor because of the gulf between Mr Uribe and the FARC over pre-conditions for talks and the terms of an exchange. Mr Uribe accepted the possible release of 500 FARC prisoners, but only on the condition that they did not rejoin their ranks as the FARC leadership wanted.

There is also disagreement over the size of the demilitarised zone where talks would be held. On December 7th Mr Uribe announced that he would provide a demilitarised zone (not exceeding 150 sq km) to hold talks. He made a similar offer in 2005, but the FARC demanded a much larger zone, similar to the size of the one they were given during the failed talks under the Pastrana administration (which the FARC used to regroup and rearm). Although the FARC subsequently reduced their demands, it is uncertain how they will respond to Mr Uribe’s latest actions.

In any event, the episode with Mr Chávez was an embarrassment, at the least. For some Colombians, particularly the family members and associates of the hostages, it was worse still. They view Mr Uribe as having acted unwisely in suddenly ending Mr Chávez’s efforts, in which they held some hope of success.

Although the government will continue to try to find a solution, chances of this will shrink as Mr Uribe gets closer to the end of his presidential term (August 2010). The FARC will not want to hand him any victory unless they get their own conditions met. So, Mr Uribe, who has chalked up many successes in his drive to provide greater security to Colombians, could well leave office with little progress made, and a blemish on this presidency, in this area.