Chavez 'stifles Venezuelan media'

Mr Chavez denounced "manipulating media campaign" Media attack Chavez

Private media companies from across the Americas have accused Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of stifling press freedom in his country.

Delegates at a meeting of the Inter- American Press Association in Caracas said Mr Chavez was using intimidation to curb criticism of his government.

They cited his threats to close down one of Venezuela's TV channels.

Meanwhile, the Venezuelan government is holding a series of events in Caracas to counter "media terrorism".

Globovision issue

Executives at the Iapa meeting, which represents more than 1,000 publications, accused President Chavez of attacking and intimidating media outlets in Venezuela.

Several hundred people took part in the pro-Chavez rally

They cited Mr Chavez's threats to shut down Globovision - one of two Venezuelan TV channels that remain critical of the government.

"Chavez's government denies media outlets that are not subordinate to his hegemony access to public information", David Natera, publisher of Venezuela's Correo del Caroni newspaper, was quoted as saying by the Associated Press news agency.

The IAPA gathering also said that freedom of speech was under threat in a number of other countries across the continent.

Pro-Chavez rally

Meanwhile, several hundred supporters of Mr Chavez held a protest rally in Caracas against Iapa.

They described the association's delegates as "fascists" and "liars" and also accused the private media in Venezuela of trying to destabilise Mr Chavez's government.

"This march is a protest to tell the world that here there is freedom of expression. It's against the constant threats and aggression from the media who are constantly saying there is no freedom of speech," Rander Pena, one of the protesters, told the BBC.

The rally was part of a series of events staged by the Venezuelan government to denounce what it has described as "media terrorism".

On Friday, Mr Chavez praised the participants of the anti-Iapa forum.

He also denounced what he called a "manipulating media campaign" against his government.

Bush the Multilateralist

John McCain gave a major foreign policy address in Los Angeles Wednesday, and if his intention was to convey a subtle message about what distinguishes him from the current White House occupant, he seems to have succeeded -- at least with the press.

The presumptive Republican nominee spoke of the need for a "new global compact" based on "mutual respect and trust," of adding "luster to America's image in the world," and of "paying a 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind.'" The media played it all up as an attempt to distance himself from the "unilateral" President Bush, although the Arizona Republican never used that word.

We fully understand why Mr. McCain feels the need to show that his Administration would not simply be a third Bush term. But with Mr. Bush's days in office nearing an end, it's worth blowing apart the myth of the "go it alone" Presidency. The truth is that, with a couple of exceptions, he's been the model of a modern multilateralist.

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Mr. Bush came under early fire after announcing that the U.S. would reject the Kyoto Protocol. Of course, the U.S. had never ratified Kyoto, and the Clinton Administration had refused even to submit it for a vote. In 1997, the Senate voted 95-0 not to endorse any climate change pact that didn't include China, India and other developing countries, as Kyoto didn't. Voting "aye" were Ted Kennedy, John Kerry and Harry Reid, among other noted unilateralists.

Then came September 11 and the war in Afghanistan, which the U.S. continues to wage under a NATO flag. Unfortunately -- and despite the honorable exceptions of Britain, Canada and Holland -- few of America's allies in the theater are willing to commit more troops, much less put them in harm's way.

Iraq is where the unilateral myth settled into media concrete. But in fact, in 2002 President Bush bucked the advice of his more hawkish advisers and agreed to take Tony Blair's advice and seek another U.N. Resolution -- was it the 16th or 17th? -- against Saddam Hussein. Resolution 1441 passed 15-0. True, the Administration failed to obtain a second resolution, not least because the French reneged on private assurances that it would agree to a second resolution if America obtained the first. But who was being unilateral there? As it was, the "coalition of the willing" that liberated Iraq included, besides the U.S. contingent, some 60,000 troops from 39 countries, who have operated under a U.N. resolution blessing their presence.

The Bush Administration has since become all too multilateralist, even -- or especially -- regarding the "axis of evil." On North Korea, the Administration adhered strictly to the six party formula. Oddly, the same critics who decry "unilateralism" would prefer that the U.S. negotiate with Pyongyang directly -- which is to say, unilaterally -- and do without the help currently being offered by Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul and Moscow.

As for Iran, following revelations in 2002 that Iran had secretly pursued an illegal nuclear program for 15 years, Mr. Bush agreed to hand over the diplomacy to Germany, Britain and France, the so-called E3. Their efforts failed. So the Administration agreed to negotiate directly with Iran provided the mullahs suspend their uranium enrichment program. The Iranians refused.

Next the Administration succeeded in turning the matter over to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has been seeking answers about Tehran's nuclear file for five years. The IAEA's questions have yet to be fully answered. In 2006, the U.N. Security Council set a deadline for Iran to suspend enrichment. The deadline was flouted. The Security Council has since agreed to three weak resolutions sanctioning Iran. Even as his days in office dwindle, Mr. Bush has adhered to this failing multilateral diplomacy.

Shall we go on? For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Administration arranged the so-called "road map," which is overseen by the "Quartet" of the U.S., Russia, the U.N., and the European Union. In Lebanon, the Administration worked closely with none other than France's Jacques Chirac to force the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005. With Russia, Mr. Bush welcomed its bid to join the World Trade Organization and has rebuffed suggestions -- including from Mr. McCain in his speech Wednesday -- that it be expelled from the G-8.

Mohamed ElBaradei owes his third term as head of the IAEA to the Administration, never mind that he all but openly campaigned for John Kerry in the 2004 election. On Darfur, the Administration has repeatedly deferred to the African Union and a pair of U.N. Secretary-Generals. Even after gathering evidence of secret Sudanese bombing runs in Darfur last year, Mr. Bush bowed to a special plea by the U.N.'s Ban Ki-moon to give diplomacy more time. The killings have continued. On global warming, the Administration has sought a compact with Australia, India and China to develop more carbon-neutral technologies.

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All of this goes unnoticed by the news media, which long ago settled on their "unilateral" stereotype and which has now become a Democratic talking point. Here's a prediction: Despite their campaign talk about cooperating with the world, two years into a McCain, Obama or Clinton Presidency our relations with Europe and the Middle East won't be much different than they are today. These disputes have far more to do with underlying differences in national interest and values than they do with the myth of Mr. Bush's unilateral diplomacy.

Supporting the forces of democracy

CSP Security Forum | by Luis Fleischman The U.S. must work to counter Chavez's propaganda and diminish his influence. Throughout the numerous articles written on the pages of the Americas Report, and in recent testimony given by the Center for Security Policy's Hemispheric Security Project, we stated our vision of the current Latin American problem. To sum up, Hugo Chavez is the leader of a new plan that goes beyond Venezuela. He advocates not merely socialism but also a totalitarian project. This totalitarian vision is not only aimed at Venezuela but also towards as many Latin American countries as possible. In order to achieve this Chavez interferes in his neighbors internal politics and establishes direct connections with groups who share his goals. In order to accomplish this he has established alliances with violent groups that have the potential to destabilize a particular country's government. This need for violence leads him to form alliances with regimes that have mastered the art of violence such as Cuba and Belarus and countries that know how to convert violence into systematic terrorism like Iran. Latin America is already experiencing a situation of violence and international instability as the recent confrontation between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela has shown. Recent meetings sponsored by the Organization of American States in Santo Domingo were aimed at reconciling the parties and as such attempted to be evenhanded. However, it is abundantly clear that it is Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa who should be held responsible for supporting and enabling an ominous anti-Colombian terrorist organization (the FARC). However, Correa would not have dared to host terrorists in his country if it weren't for the previously mentioned regional tactics of Hugo Chavez. Therefore, in the name of regional peace in Latin America and geo-political security, it is crucial that the United States government as well as other governments in the Western Hemisphere help those who can be effective in counterbalancing these developments. Venezuela is the epicenter of the Latin America earthquake and as long as Chavez is in power these threats will continue. We depart from the assumption that if the Chavez regime collapses the revolutionary intensity and potential international escalation in the region will significantly decline. All those who believe that Chavez's regime is facing major economic problems which he will not be able to survive forget that a regime can survive even under economic hardship. It is enough to look at what Fidel Castro has done for the last five decades, what the Soviet Union did for seven and a half decades and what the Iranians have done for three. Paraphrasing writer Isaac Bashevis Singer we can say "Between dying and dead there is long leg." Illusions and hopes will not bring us results but taking a good look at the forces operating in Venezuela today may provide a better understanding of the situation and help us act accordingly. In Venezuela, like in many countries in Latin America, the natural vehicles of political debate and opposition-the political parties- have become weak as a result of ongoing corruption, disconnection from the public, aloofness from sources of societal support, and lack of social and political vision. The virtual collapse (but not total disappearance) of the two traditional parties, the AD and COPEI, that ruled Venezuela for forty years gave way to a plethora of political parties, none of them capable of properly challenging Chavez. Moreover, attempts at unity between the parties to form a single front against Chavez have often ended in disunity and collapse of coalitions. Non-political elements such as business, workers and oil associations have played a role in opposing Chavez, particularly before the recall referendum of August 2004. These groups comprised the most active opposition by organizing strikes and massive protests against the government. Newly mobilized groups that collected signatures during the recall referendum and other groups who demanded electoral transparence joined them. However, these groups as well as the political parties lost importance as they experienced major defeats during the 2004 recall referendum, parliamentary elections in 2005 (where the political parties' abstention determined the virtual elimination of a real opposition in parliament) and the Presidential elections in 2006. These events strengthened Chavez's position and left behind a demoralized and passive opposition that waited for another round of elections to win. However, it was General Raul Isaias Baduel who turned events around in Venezuela when he publicly denounced the December 2, 2007 Referendum on Constitutional Reform as an attempt by Chavez to carry a coup d'etat and perpetuate himself in power. During the campaign Baduel loudly urged Venezuelans to vote against the reform. The referendum ended in a major defeat for Hugo Chavez. General Raul Isaias Baduel turned events around in Venezuela when he publicly denounced the December 2, 2007 Referendum on Constitutional Reform as an attempt by Chavez to carry a coup d'etat and perpetuate himself in power. Source: Diario Critico. The importance of Baduel's intervention was manifold. First, he denounced the Chavez reform as an attempt to take power away from the people and he did it publicly. The fact that Baduel was a military man, a former Chavez chief of the Venezuelan army and a former defense minister sent a message to the people of Venezuela that Chavez's power system was being challenged from within. Consequently, Venezuelans lost fear and defeated an otherwise self-confident Chavez. By the same token, Baduel's actions motivated disenchanted Chavistas to join forces against their former master. Such action was followed by other actions. During the hostage crisis in Colombia last February when the Colombian narco-guerilla group known as the FARC negotiated, with Chavez mediation, the release of Colombian hostages, Baduel publicly criticized the President's complicity with the FARC. Following Baduel's statement, the army, a source of silent support for Chavez, expressed uneasiness with the Venezuelan leader's association with the FARC sending a clear signal to Chavez. At the same time, Baduel also urged Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe to dismiss Chavez's threats against Colombia. Early in March after a Colombian incursion in Ecuador killed a senior FARC leader, Chavez threatened to unleash war. Baduel then courageously called on the Venezuelan army not to fight and defended Colombia, in open defiance of Hugo Chavez. In that instance, the General also openly accused Chavez of inventing an external enemy to encourage nationalistic feelings in order to hide the internal failures of the Bolivarian regime. General Baduel has demonstrated his effectiveness by having challenged Chavez's unquestionable authority and arrogant behavior. He was effective because he aborted Chavez's totalitarian project. Totalitarians want to show omnipotence. Baduel took that away from Chavez after the December 2nd election. Despite these brave actions, General Baduel's motives are now being questioned. Is General Baduel an opportunist looking for recognition and personal gain? Or is h e for real? Should we trust him ? Should the Venezuelan people trust him? If yes, what role could he play in Venezuelan politics? Is he another military man that will depose a civilian and impose a bloody regime? Or can he become a leader of a civilian political party and defeat Chavez via constitutional means? Let us take a look at the man. One day before the constitutional referendum he published an article in the New York Times where he expressed his opposition to those reforms. He opposes a socialist state because "it has absolute control over the people it governs". In this well-written article Baduel criticized the traditional political parties for seeing "the Venezuelan people as clients who can be bought off" and for using oil money to dispense "favors, subsidies and alms". Under Chavez, Baduel believes the situation is even worse because of "exorbitant public expenditures, the recurrence of government deficits even at times of record-high oil prices, the extreme vulnerability of foreign investments, exceedingly high import tariffs, and our increased domestic consumption of fuel at laughably low prices". Baduel predicts that the economy will crash and along with it, Chavez's neo-populist policies. He suggests that a strong office of the President under the leadership of Chavez can only accelerate this national deterioration. [1] Thus, Baduel has tried to bring Venezuelans into a debate on national issues of importance such as oil policy and how to use oil resources and oil income. Baduel, as a military man has made declarations that are atypical of traditional Latin American generals. Curiously enough, Baduel is the man known for having intervened to save the Chavez's regime during a coup d'etat against him in April, 2002. This has legitimately raised some eyebrows. However, Baduel in a declaration a month later explained that he was committed to the constitutional order and the rule of law. This may explain Baduel's opposition to the coup d'etat [2]. These views were ratified later in 2006 in a different context. In reaction to Chavez's assertion that the Venezuelan armed forces as well as the national oil company were "red" (communist), Baduel pointed out that the "constitution establishes that the armed forces are strictly professional ¼ . (Therefore) I understand that there should not be any relation between political and military power". [3] In April, 2007 Baduel again reaffirmed this principle [4]. In July, 2007 at the time of his retirement as Secretary of Defense he warned that socialism cannot be part of a marxist orthodoxy but has to be deeply democratic and respectful of the division of powers. [5] Judging by his words and actions, Baduel does not fit the profile of an opportunist. Opportunists abound in the world of politics but Baduel has defended a number of principles that typical opportunists cannot even articulate. Baduel is still commited to socialism (which explains his previous association with Chavez) but at the same time has issued a convincing affirmation of democracy and constituionalism as a supreme principle of governance. He has criticized Chavez in a timely manner on very specific points without the typical generalization of a demagogue. He criticized the Chavez oil policies, his aggression against Colombia, and his support for the FARC. He not only helped to bring about Chavez's defeat in the December 2nd Referendum but has made his influence felt among army officers who rejected Chavez's complicity with the FARC and his anti-Colombian aggression. Baduel seems to be, by virtue of his actions, the natural leader of a peaceful and democratic social movement whose de-facto goal seems to be to to put an end to Chavez's irresponsible and aggressive domestic and international practices. He seems to have the potential to seriously weaken the current Bolivarian Project. If Baduel's voice continues to be heard it may bring about another Chavez defeat in the October, 2008 regional and municipal elections. There are a number of candidates from oppositionat parties that will be running. This does not mean that there is no room for other parties in a post-Chavez era but Baduel may well be the man most capable of triggering the transition. For his actions Baduel has taken a big risk. His own life is at the mercy of the unscrupolous Chavez' regime which may try to harm him. In relation to US policy, we can say that every decision involves a risk. Not making a decision also involves a risk. In considering our policy options, the United States should provide encouragement and support to people like General Baduel.